POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL	Paper Marked **C**

Report of	**OFFICES OF CHIEF CONSTABLE AND POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER**
Subject	**RISK REGISTER**
Date	**TUESDAY 20th JUNE – 10.00 A.M.**
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Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 8th May 2017 and was chaired by DCC Bannister. At this board the OPCC were represented. The JARAP were unrepresented.

4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Chief Finance Officer and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Risk

5. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

6. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a 'RAG' rating.

Priority Rating	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 - 16	High	Monthly
5 - 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 - 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk status

7. *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

    Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term 'Awaiting Control' is used to describe this status.

    Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

    Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.

    Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Strategic risks

8. On the corporate risk register there are 41 police strategic risks and 9 OPCC strategic risks.

    The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

Corporate Risk Rating Grid		Likelihood			
		Very High	High	Medium	Low
Impact	Very High	0	1	3	0
	High	1	4	8	6
	Medium	2	1	14	7
	Low	0	1	0	2

There are 6 high priority risks, 2 of which are risks of note. There is 1 new risk. Since the last JARAP meeting, 2 risks have been archived. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A.

The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial	**STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN.** Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade, ongoing contract with Airwave in the event of a transition delay and purchase of new equipment.
	STR1329 – Transforming services. This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.
Equality impact assessment	**STR430 – Disability related harassment.** The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable service may be damaged.
Risks and impact	As per the tables above.
Link to Police and Crime Plan	As per report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix

Persons to contact

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Appendix A – Strategic Risks

High risks

STR1844	Failure to transition to the ESN		
Responsible Officer	Chief Superintendent Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	15/08/14	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	The Tri force collaboration is managing the transition to ESN as a programme. Leicestershire Police's contract with Airwave is due to expire on 06/01/17. Airwave is a private network, based on the TETRA standard that uses masts to provide national coverage. Centrally the government are driving the procurement process as every emergency service will move to mobile communications. There is a national project team that is engaging with individual forces to gauge concerns and provide updates.		
Impact	This risk is concerned with the operational impact of not transitioning. There is uncertainty about how well the mobile network will respond to increased traffic and whether the emergency services will have priority. In addition, we do not know what functionality issues there may be and how our practices may have to be altered.		
Existing Controls	• Purchase of repair credits for existing Sepura Airwave radios. • Monitoring of Airwave performance • COT oversight • Maintaining close contact with national police project team • Regional Airwave user group • Regional coordination and strategic oversight • Tri Force Programme • ICCS infrastructure upgrade		
Update	**28/04/17 – Helen Chamberlain:-** Forces will not only be required to meet the costs of supporting their continued use of Airwave and the ESN costs, if they fail to transition within the allotted time there will also be a fee which will be shared across all 3 Emergency Services. **Current status: managed.**		

STR1679	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime		
Responsible Officer	Caroline Barker Crime Registrar	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading "Missed Opportunities" which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.		
Impact	Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.		
Existing Controls	• Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check • Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit • Task and finish groups – part of Get it Right 1st Time • Communication plan – as part of Get it Right 1st Time • Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group • HMIC inspection • Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit		
Additional Controls	• Get it Right 1st Time delivery plan		
Update	**24/04/17 – Caroline Barker:-** The controls remain the same. HMIC are currently in force reviewing crime data integrity. When the outcome of this inspection is known we will be in a better place to review this risk, the controls in place and further action that may be required. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR1935	Management of seized and found property provision		
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	30/06/16	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	A series of internal audits and related staff issues have highlighted that the organisational provision and processes relating to property are in need of comprehensive review. Some of the themes highlighted include; no single point of leadership, lack of clear processes and a high volume of property retained with no systematic process for disposal. With this risk there is an opportunity to improve the current service provision.		
Impact	There is an operational impact of items being missing, which may be required for investigation purposes. There is a reputational risk associated to the poor management of the force property provision where items are lost, whether through theft or being unaccounted for.		
Existing Controls	• Internal audit completed • Force Property Working Group • Safe audit • Appointment of Project Manager and team • Force Property Manager • Policies and procedures		
Additional Controls	• Property review project		
Update	**16/05/17 – Jez Leavesley (Property Project Consultant):-** Niche Property will go live on 04/10/17, with all current property entries on the KIM property management system being transferred across. Staff continue to try and drive down the property marked for disposal with a particular focus on the items stored in the main freezer. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR473	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO policy		
Responsible Officer	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Vetting Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	22/03/10	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	Medium (8)
Information	The ACPO National Vetting Policy is partially implemented; anybody joining the organisation after January 2012 are vetted to the ACPO national guidance. Anyone who joined the organisation before this date (approximately 60% of current workforce - in excess of 2500 people) are not vetted to the national standards. The risk posed extends to resources deployed to regional units such as EMOpSS and EMSOU.		
Impact	There is an ongoing risk associated to a) operational security, b) corruption and c) organisational reputation.		
Existing Controls	• Centralisation of vetting within PSD • Review of the force vetting function • Priority EMOpSS vetting • Renewal procedure for CTC introduced • Compliance with policy for all new employees • Priority vetting cases identification • Operational security • New starters vetted per ACPO policy • Business Case Implementation 2015		
Additional Controls	• Ensure all staff are vetted in line with policy • All staff to be subject of aftercare / review		
Update	**22/05/17 – Chief Inspector Simon Hurst (Professional Standards):-** The Force cannot provide (with the limitations of the existing vetting IT system) vetting data to the degree of accuracy required by the HMIC (under the auspices of the PEEL inspection regime). Simple questions (such as the amount of staff vetted within the organisation and the amount not vetted and when renewal dates are due) are beyond the capabilities of the existing system without extensive manual effort. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

OPCC1694		Lack of resource and capacity available to the PCC	
Responsible Officer	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Infrastructure	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	Lack of appropriate resource and capacity available to OPCC.		
Impact	Ability to deliver PCC priorities.		
Existing Controls	- Review and consider options for new PCC Deputy and Advisor arrangements - PDR process to monitor and enhance staff performance and development - OPCC structure reviewed and new structure finalised - Undertake interim and permanent review of structure to ensure appropriate - Continuous development permanent resource - Skills analysis requirements for the OPCC completed as part of new structure - Existing staff matched into roles within the new structures - Experienced and interim staff provide capacity - All "non operational" employees of the Office of the Chief Constable available to PCC - PDRs in place for all staff - Undertake OPCC team development sessions to focus and develop the workforce - Business Plan in place and under review - Deputy PCC review of office		
Additional Controls	- Force and interim staff to provide additional capacity - Recruit to roles in office - Undertake appropriate consultation with staff - Develop training and PDRs for all office staff		
Update	**24/05/17 – Helen King:-** The deputy PCC has completed his review of the office structure. Job descriptions have been drafted and evaluation is almost completed. The CEO role has been advertised and shortlisting is taking place, interviews will in June 2017. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

OPCC1696		Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources	
Responsible Officer	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	Low (1)
Information	The PCC is making decisions which are informed by force data and information.		
Impact	If the data is not up to date or accurate this may affect the decisions made or where resources are allocated.		
Existing Controls	- Data quality audits undertaken by HMIC - Systems in place for providing good quality financial information - Additional scrutiny applied by SAB - Identify and communicate data requirements to the force - Ongoing data audit and assurance programme - Review the findings of recent data quality audits to understand current position - Regular reports on data quality to appropriate forums - Review performance and information requirements to meet PCC's priorities		
Additional Controls	- HMIC effectiveness audit reviewed - Force action plan requested by PCC at each SAB meeting - Detailed action plan review at June SAB meeting - PCC update to Police and Crime Panel in July 2017 - HMIC data integrity audit underway - Hot debrief and full report awaited - Force to review internal audit methodology to ensure it reflects HMIC methodology		
Update	**24/05/17 – Helen King:-** This risk has increased due to the recently published HMIC Effectiveness Audit in March and pending initial concerns raised regarding the HMIC Data Integrity inspection. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

New risk

STR1961	Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system		
Responsible Officer	Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Medium
Date Recorded	22/03/17	Current Rating	Medium (8)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	When Leicestershire Police transferred to Niche the PLX data script was configured to match Lincolnshire however whilst that matched their processes it did not match ours. This meant that between April 2015 (Niche go live) and 20/01/17 no names were being uploaded to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS). Therefore checks completed by the DBS would not reveal offender information.		
Impact	This is an operational risk due to the amount of work that may be involved in retrospective checking. It is also a reputational risk should offenders have been issued with a certificate incorrectly and they have to be withdrawn.		
Existing Controls	• NICHE programme • Regional Niche Team • National PND User Group • Regional PND User Group • Engagement with DBS • Notts acting as lead force • Chief officer oversight		
Update	**22/03/17 – Inspector Dan Granger (Niche Project Team):-** Nottinghamshire Police are acting as the lead force for the region to engage with the DBS to discuss the implications and how retrospective checks can be completed for the period of time data was unavailable. **Current status: managed.**		

Risks archived

STR1952	Cyber Attack via Telephone Denial of Service (TDOS) on 999 system		
Responsible Officer	Jason Ross Contact Management	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	30/12/16	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	Low (3)
Information	On 29/12/16 Leicestershire Police was subject of a Telephone Denial of Service (TDOS) cyber attack on 999 lines; 120 calls were received over 8 hours, with 56 calls within 10 minutes. This caused an overspill of 999 calls to Northants but had the potential to saturate the 999 system		
Impact	This type of attack can prevent genuine calls being put through and has an impact on our ability to maintain a critical function.		
Existing Controls	• Meeting held with IT Comms • National PNC broadcast • Briefing/messages • Short term contingency • Investigation commenced		
Update	**09/03/17 – Chief Inspector Jason Ross:-** An investigation was completed by Special Branch in consultation with BT to obtain further details about the originating number. The calls were identified to be coming from one mobile telephone (a Polish number) rather than a spoofing possibility. There have been no further incidents. **Current status: managed.**		

STR1875	Increased number of subject to vetting contracts issued		
Responsible Officer	Julie Saunders HR Business Partner	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Medium
Date Recorded	16/12/14	Current Rating	Low (4)
Category	People (Staff & Community)	Previous Rating	Low (4)
Information	Due to a delay in the national vetting process local checks were being completed, and where the results satisfactory a number of staff and officers recruited with subject to vetting contracts. Although this is accepted practise by Leicestershire Police the number of such contracts was abnormally high (approximately 30). The national vetting process comprises of additional familial and finance checks. Typically, some of those that pass the local checks will fail the national checks completed.		
Impact	There are a number of risks associated to issuing subject to vetting contracts:- security consideration for allowing access to premises and systems to staff who are not fully vetted, the reputational impact of employing staff particularly police officers who are not fully vetted if later checks reveal information that conflicts with the professional standards of behaviour. In addition, the employment of police officers is governed to specific regulations which mean officers cannot be easily dismissed but would be subject to misconduct procedures.		
Existing Controls	• Risk assessment process • Local vetting checks • Other force checks • PSD aware • Information to new starters • Client liaison meetings • Protective Monitoring System		
Update	**26/03/17 – Julie Saunders:-** The number of subject to vetting contracts issued has now decreased significantly. Some will continue to be issued in line with normal practise and this will be considered business as usual. **Current status: controlled.**		

Appendix B		Corporate Risk Register						24th May 2017		
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	Recorded	Last review	Priority	Previous rating
STR1844	Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Failure to transition to the ESN.	Very High	High	Managed	August 2014	28/04/17	12	12
STR473	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Security Vetting Manager	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO national vetting policy.	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	March 2010	22/05/17	12	8
OPCC1696	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	9	1
STR1679	Caroline Barker Crime Registrar	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	24/04/17	9	9
STR1935	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Management of seized and found property provision.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2016	16/05/17	9	9
OPCC1694	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	9	9
STR1954	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.	Very High	Medium	Managed	January 2017	15/05/17	8	8
STR1949	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	15/05/17	8	8
STR1961	Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager	Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system.	Very High	Medium	Managed	March 2017	19/04/17	8	New Risk
STR1922	Chris Cockerill Operations Lead Criminal Justice	Inability to adequately audit Niche.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	October 2015	24/05/17	8	8
STR1940	Jason Ross Chief Inspector CMD	Failure to meet 101 call handling target.	Medium	Very High	Controlled	September 2016	22/05/17	8	8
STR1948	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of LAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	03/04/17	6	6
STR1947	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of WAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2016	04/04/17	6	6
STR1953	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	24/05/17	6	6
STR1936	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact of Tri-force Collaboration on local Change Programme.	High	Medium	Managed	June 2016	04/05/17	6	6
STR1926	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Quality of video recorded evidence.	High	Medium	Controlled	January 2016	09/03/17	6	6
STR1939	Andrew Rodwell Communications Manager	Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.	High	Medium	Controlled	September 2016	25/04/17	6	6
STR420	Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety	Management system for energy use.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2010	19/05/17	6	6

STR1801	Alison Naylor HR Director	Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.	Medium	High	Controlled	June 2014	24/05/17	6	6
STR1329	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2012	04/05/17	6	6
STR1917	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the 'Building the Picture' HMIC recommendations.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/03/17	4	4
STR1519	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	RMADS management for information security.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2012	31/03/17	4	4
STR1916	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/03/17	4	4
STR11	Alison Naylor HR Director	Potential for industrial action affecting our service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	October 2007	24/05/17	4	4
OPCC1700	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	4	4
OPCC1690	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	4	4
STR1521	Simon Hurst Professional Standards	Criminal behaviour/impropriety by staff.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2012	02/03/17	4	4
STR508	Adam Streets Head of Corporate Services	Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	April 2010	24/04/17	4	4
STR1706	Alison Naylor HR Director	Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2013	24/05/17	4	4
STR533	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	The fair and effective use of stop and search to promote confidence.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2010	19/04/17	4	4
OPCC1698	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	4	4
OPCC1695	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	4	4
OPCC1864	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2014	24/05/17	4	4
OPCC1699	Helen King Head of Commissioning	Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	24/05/17	4	4
STR1945	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Freedom of information requests – demand v capacity.	Low	High	Controls Tasked	November 2016	31/03/17	3	3
STR1764	David Craig Head of IT	Accreditation for the use of the PSN.	High	Low	Controlled	January 2014	04/05/17	3	3
STR564	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Management of MFH enquiries.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2010	09/03/17	3	3
STR1571	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.	High	Low	Managed	September 2012	09/03/17	3	3
STR458	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Failure to protect vulnerable persons.	High	Low	Controlled	March 2010	09/03/17	3	3

STR520	Adam Streets Head of Corporate Services	Governance of collaborative arrangements.	High	Low	Controlled	May 2010	24/04/17	3	3
STR253	David Craig Head of IT	High risk of virus introduction and data loss.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2009	24/04/17	3	3
STR1910	Jason Ross Contact Management	Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.	Medium	Low	Controlled	August 2015	20/04/17	2	4
STR310	David Sandall Head of Crime and Intelligence	Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'.	Medium	Low	Controlled	November 2009	24/04/17	2	3
STR1915	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/03/17	2	4
STR1946	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	November 2016	10/05/17	2	2
STR430	Lynne Woodward Head of Equalities	Inquiry into disability related harassment.	Medium	Low	Managed	March 2010	09/03/17	2	2
STR380	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) criteria.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	January 2010	16/05/17	2	2
STR1623	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.	Medium	Low	Controlled	February 2013	15/05/17	2	2
OPCC1934	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Newly elected PCC for LLR could result in widespread change.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2016	24/05/17	1	1
STR1475	Shane O'Neill Local Policing Lead	Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	May 2012	02/05/17	1	1

New risk	New risk owner	Risk of note

Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
	Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance/ Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction
Very High	4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force >1,000,000 Business area >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
High	3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force 251,000-1,000,000 Business area 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Medium	2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force 51,000-250,000 Business area 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Low	1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force <50,000 Business area <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood			
	Score		
Very High	4	>75% chance of occurrence	Almost certain to occur
High	3	51-75% chance of occurrence	More likely to occur than not
Medium	2	25-50% chance of occurrence	Fairly likely to occur
Low	1	<25% chance of occurrence	Unlikely to occur

Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16 = High
5 - 8 = Medium
1 - 4 = Low

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