POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL	Paper Marked C

Report of	OFFICES OF CHIEF CONSTABLE AND POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
Subject	RISK REGISTER
Date	THURSDAY 21st DECEMBER 2017 – 2.00 P.M.
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Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 6th November 2017 and was chaired by DCC Bannister. At this board the OPCC and JARAP were represented.

4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Head of Governance and Assurance and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Risk

5. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

6. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a 'RAG' rating.

Priority Rating	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 - 16	High	Monthly
5 - 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 - 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk status

7.   *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

   Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term 'Awaiting Control' is used to describe this status.

   Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

   Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.

   Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Strategic risks

8.   On the corporate risk register there are 45 police strategic risks and 8 OPCC strategic risks.

   The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

Corporate Risk Rating Grid		Likelihood			
		Very High	High	Medium	Low
Impact	Very High	0	2	4	0
	High	1	3	13	6
	Medium	1	0	12	5
	Low	0	2	0	4

   There are 6 high priority risks, 5 risks of note and 5 new risks. Since the last JARAP meeting, 3 risks have been archived. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A.

   The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial   **STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN.**
                                    Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade, ongoing contract with Airwave in the event of a transition delay and purchase of new equipment.

                                    STR1329 – Transforming services.
                                    This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.

Equality impact assessment **STR430 – Disability related harassment.**
                                    The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable

service may be damaged.

Risks and impact　　　　　　As per the tables above.

Link to Police and　　　　　　As per report.
Crime Plan

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix

Persons to contact

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Appendix A – Strategic Risks

High risks

STR1844	Failure to transition to the ESN		
Responsible Officer	Helen Chamberlain Chief Superintendent Tri Force Collaboration (TFC)	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	15/08/14	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	Airwave is a private network, based on the TETRA standard that uses masts to provide national coverage. Centrally the government are driving the procurement process as every emergency service will move to mobile communications. There is a national project team that is engaging with individual forces to gauge concerns and provide updates.		
Impact	This risk is concerned with the operational impact of not transitioning. There is uncertainty about how well the mobile network will respond to increased traffic and whether the emergency services will have priority. In addition, we do not know what functionality issues there may be and how our practices may have to be altered.		
Existing Controls	• Purchase of repair credits for existing Sepura Airwave radios. • Monitoring of Airwave performance • COT oversight • Maintaining close contact with national police project team • Regional Airwave user group • Regional coordination and strategic oversight • Tri Force Programme • ICCS infrastructure upgrade		
Update	**13/11/17 – Sally Brooks (TFC ESN Project Manager):-** The Transition has been delayed. The Home Office will release an updated transition plan in the new year. It has been decided that all Forces will keep their own Risk Management strategy/register/scoring matrix and then the region will score the risks again using an agreed scoring matrix that they adopt. The risks identified for Leicestershire have been scored with the Risk and BC Advisor to ensure they align to the Leicestershire scoring matrix. **Current status: managed.**		

STR473	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO policy		
Responsible Officer	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Vetting Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	22/03/10	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	The ACPO National Vetting Policy is partially implemented; anybody joining the organisation after January 2012 are vetted to the ACPO national guidance. Anyone who joined the organisation before this date are not vetted to the national standards. The risk posed extends to resources deployed to regional units.		
Impact	There is an ongoing risk associated to operational security, corruption and reputation.		
Existing Controls	• Centralisation of vetting within PSD • Review of the force vetting function • Priority EMOpSS vetting • Renewal procedure for CTC introduced • Compliance with policy for all new employees • Operational security • New starters vetted per ACPO policy • Business Case Implementation 2015		
Additional Controls	• Ensure all staff are vetted in line with policy • All staff to be subject of aftercare / review		
Update	15/11/17 – Mandy Bogle-Reilly:- The Regional Tri Force Collaboration IT project was the likely funding stream for any Vetting IT solution that we were attempting to procure. We had hoped to achieve a four force purchase (Leics, Lincs, Northants and Notts). With the withdrawal of the entire project, funding for any solution will most probably have to be met by individual forces on a funding formula basis. Recruitment has been completed with 3 new vetting researchers now in place. The number of staff not vetted appropriately has reduced from 46% to 37% and the project remains on track. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR380	Current job evaluation scheme unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission		
Responsible Officer	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	People (Staff & Community)	Previous Rating	Low (2)
Information	Following a review of the Force Job Evaluation Scheme (JES) - the JES does not meet with the EOC criteria. This particularly relates to: Linked grades, gender, equal pay, & age discrimination. Should a claim be made against the Force and a finding made against us, the claims could be substantial; particularly over generic roles. As a result the Hay Scheme of job evaluation has been undertaken. The findings are now being assessed and shared with Union groups.		
Impact	There is a significant financial risk associated to the findings of the review being implemented.		
Existing Controls	• Existing Control Name • Intrusive management of the JES • Consideration of other JE Schemes • Force Equal Pay Review		
Additional Controls	• Implementation of the Hay Scheme		
Update	24/10/17 – Becky Milligan (HR Business Partner):- The project is currently at a critical stage. The project team have been working with a consultancy company to develop potential pay models and how we can align the evaluation scores to pay. This has been narrowed to two proposals which have been shared with the Trade Unions, COT and the SMT of the OPCC. A decision will need to be made by the Chief and PCC about which proposal they want to move forward with and we will look to assess how we inform individuals of the outcomes. **Current status: managed.**		

STR2006	Management of Archive provision		
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	03/10/17	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The current Archive provision lacks resilience through adequate governance, policy and procedure and staffing establishment. Items received from across the force, including crime case files, interview tapes and pocket notebooks are not always catalogued or stored in a methodical manner, case files are separated and difficult to re-locate owing to system legacy issues and review, retention and disposal processes are fragmented and not NRAC compliant. Retrieval of records for further investigation or review is difficult. There are also over 200,000 evidential interview cassette tapes that have not been digitised and are degrading, with some being unreadable. With this risk there is an opportunity to significantly improve the current service provision.		
Impact	There is an operational impact of records/items found to be missing or un-locatable, which may be required for investigation purposes or case review. The current system provides little assurance that our obligations under MOPI are being met. This presents a significant reputational risk to the force.		
Additional Controls	• Archive review project • New Force data manager and 6 RRD staff • Proposed regional MOPI RRD procedure • Archive provision moving to shared property new build • Centralised structure incorporated into the Evidential Property Team		
Update	**20/11/17 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager):-** Responsibility for the Archive provision will be transferred to Corporate Services in January 2018. A number of work streams have been identified, which include – development of new policy and procedure, governance structure, physical storage and interdependencies with other teams to ensure the approach is aligned and MOPI compliant. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR1679	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime		
Responsible Officer	Johnny Starbuck D/Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading "Missed Opportunities" which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.		
Impact	Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.		
Existing Controls	• Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check • Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit • Monthly Crime Integrity Meeting • Crime Integrity Sub Group Meetings • Communication plan • Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group • HMIC inspection • Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit		
Additional Controls	• Crime Integrity delivery plan		
Update	**07/11/17 – Johnny Starbuck:-** A delivery plan has been developed with points around the timely and accurate recording of crime. Monthly crime integrity meetings are held and a sub group also meets to identify frequent errors where further training or comms may be required. We are renewing our audit regime to identify any issues before the next HMI visit, this includes expanding the audit to ensure the sample size is sufficient. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

OPCC1696	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources		
Responsible Officer	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The PCC is making decisions which are informed by force data and information.		
Impact	If the data is not up to date or accurate this may affect the decisions made or where resources are allocated.		
Existing Controls	• Data quality audits undertaken by HMIC • Systems in place for providing good quality financial information • Additional scrutiny applied by SAB • Identify and communicate data requirements to the force • Ongoing data audit and assurance programme • Review the findings of recent data quality audits to understand current position • Regular reports on data quality to appropriate forums • Review performance and information requirements to meet PCC's priorities • Detailed action plan review at June SAB meeting • PCC update to Police and Crime Panel in July 2017		
Additional Controls	• HMIC effectiveness audit reviewed • Force action plan requested by PCC at each SAB meeting • HMIC data integrity audit underway • Hot debrief and full report awaited • Force to review internal audit methodology to ensure it reflects HMIC methodology		
Update	**01/11/17 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):-** This risk continues to be high. The Force action plan requested by the PCC is presented at each SAB meeting as close scrutiny remains in place. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

New risks

STR2009	Reduced performance as a result of Force changes		
Responsible Officer	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	24/10/17	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Changes are being made to the Force operating model to bridge the gap between increased demand and reduced resource. There is a risk that these changes may not be successful if there is increased demand in areas that the model has not been designed to respond to.		
Impact	If the Force is unable to meet demand in certain areas this may impact upon operational capability, performance and reputation.		
Existing Controls	• Performance measures • Force Change Team • Change Board • COT oversight		
Update	**24/10/17 – Andy Elliott:-** A range of performance measures have been put in place to evaluate and assess the flow of work through the new model on a daily basis. These performance measures will identify any blockages or significant failings in the new processes so that remedial action can be taken to address them. This may mean re-balancing of resources to alter the distribution based on the demand requirements. Further process and procedural changes are highly likely to occur as part of the wider force wide blueprint changes taking place. Initial changes are working well and all issues are minor and being managed proactively. **Current status: controlled.**		

STR2007	Continuity of power supply to the FHQ site		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	10/10/17	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	After recent interruptions to the HV power supply to FHQ caused by failures by Western Power Distribution on their HV network, a number of failures have been identified. These failures have identified a fault on the motor/mechanical relays within the MCCB's for the automatic return operation to mains or generator power supply to some buildings on the FHQ site, this trip will occur after any interruption to the power supply. The MCCB's have to be closed manually therefore there is a delay in the time from mains/generator electrical supplies. Out of hours we would be relying on electrical contractors, although there is no contractual call out. Due to the age of the main switch panel for FHQ repairs and maintenance are required to the incoming supply ACB the standby generator ACB and all of the MCCB's for all building on the FHQ site. This will consist of complete power isolation to the site for approximately 7 hrs.		
Impact	Loss of power to buildings and the delay in having it restored and then managing the planned isolation for repairs presents an operational risk. It impacts on teams located within the site such as contact management who undertake critical services and force wide, all business areas that rely on IT services which will be unavailable during the isolation of the supply.		
Existing Controls	• Electrical contractors on call • Increase in staff trained to manually intervene to maintain supply • Staff engagement • Crisis Management Team approach to incidents with debrief • Business continuity plans		
Additional Controls	• Planning for maintenance works		
Update	**10/10/17 – Andrew Wroe:-** Mitigation has been put in place in case of a failure with increased members of staff trained to manually intervene. Planned works have been considered via a Crisis Management Team comprising of stakeholders across the Force and an initial date has been set for April 2018 for the maintenance to be completed. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR2008	Impact of Darwin implementation		
Responsible Officer	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Medium
Date Recorded	24/10/17	Current Rating	Medium (4)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Darwin is an evolution of our policing model and introduced to respond to increasing demand and provide a better service to victims of crime Key strategic aims are to improve ownership and responsibility among investigating officers, comply with crime data integrity and design a way of working that aligns with our change programme, Police and Crime Plan and the 2025 National Policing Vision. Specifically, Darwin introduces: 1) A Triage desk in CMD which effectively manages front end demand and routes incidents to the most appropriate place. 2) A Neighbourhood Investigation Unit - this is an amalgamation of IMU, FIU and MAU and will introduce satellite hubs and will support local policing in neighbourhoods. 3) The realignment of Officers to support PRT and the creation of satellite hubs. 4) Changes to our response to missing people with the creation of two specialist teams. 5) Dedicated Custody Managers. 6) 24 hour crime recording. 7) Local ownership and management of crime.		
Impact	It is anticipated during transition and implementation of the new operating model, there is likely to be a short period of time where performance dips as the new ways of working are fully embedded.		
Existing Controls	• Darwin Gold Group • Darwin Project team • Performance regime for Darwin go live in place		
Update	**30/10/17 – Andy Elliott:-** The transition from the current way of working will be challenging, however one week into the changes the performance is stable and shows no sign of changing. Therefore this risk has been reduced from medium to low, however performance will continue to be monitored closely. **Current status: controlled.**		

STR1975	Gateway upgrade project		
Responsible Officer	Carol Hever Head of HR	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Low
Date Recorded	24/04/17	Current Rating	Low (2)
Category	People (Staff & Community)	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The HR Gateway System used by both Derbyshire and Leicestershire is currently running on an unsupported version of the software and therefore a significant piece of work has commenced to implement an upgrade. There has also a number of system enhancements available within the upgrade which the Forces wish to implement to take advantage of improved business processes. All the risks are being managed through a Programme Board governance structure		
Impact	During the upgrade programme there will be periods of downtime and the Gateway environment will only be available as 'read'. This will have an impact on duties management and a significant number of business reports used for managing and reporting on the workforce will need re-writing which will mean that data quality and availability could be affected.		
Update	**24/10/17 – Carol Hever:-** The HR Gateway system is being upgraded and will be migrated to a virtual server. The 10 days system downtime scheduled for mid to late November for this to be completed has been postponed until February 2018. Contingencies have been put in place to ensure resource planning activities, sickness reporting and accident reporting can continue. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

Risks of note

STR1935	Management of seized and found property provision		
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Medium
Date Recorded	30/06/16	Current Rating	Medium (8)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	A series of internal audits and related staff issues have highlighted that the organisational provision and processes relating to property are in need of comprehensive review. Some of the themes highlighted include; no single point of leadership, lack of clear processes and a high volume of property retained with no systematic process for disposal. With this risk there is an opportunity to improve the current service provision.		
Impact	There is an operational impact of items being missing, which may be required for investigation purposes. There is a reputational risk associated to the poor management of the force property provision where items are lost, whether through theft or being unaccounted for.		
Existing Controls	• Internal audit completed • Force Property Working Group • Safe audit • Appointment of Project Manager and team • Force Property Manager • Policies and procedures		
Additional Controls	• Property review project		
Update	**10/10/17 – Jason Masters:-** This has been reduced to an overall rating of medium to reflect the amount of mitigation now embedded to improve the management of seized and found property. Whilst this has been reduced to medium, if planning permission is refused for the new evidential property store at headquarters this may return to high risk as this has been identified as a longer term solution to the risk identified. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

OPCC1694	Lack of resource and capacity available to the PCC		
Responsible Officer	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Infrastructure	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	Lack of appropriate resource and capacity available to OPCC.		
Impact	Ability to deliver PCC priorities.		
Existing Controls	• Review and consider options for new PCC Deputy and Advisor arrangements • PDR process to monitor and enhance staff performance and development • OPCC structure reviewed and new structure 8inalized		

	• Undertake interim and permanent review of structure to ensure appropriate
	• Continuous development permanent resource
	• Skills analysis requirements for the OPCC completed as part of new structure
	• Existing staff matched into roles within the new structures
	• Experienced and interim staff provide capacity
	• All "non operational" employees of the Office of the Chief Constable available to PCC
	• PDRs in place for all staff
	• Undertake OPCC team development sessions to focus and develop the workforce
	• Business Plan in place and under review
	• Deputy PCC review of office
Additional Controls	• Force and interim staff to provide additional capacity
	• Recruit to roles in office
	• Undertake appropriate consultation with staff
	• Develop training and PDRs for all office staff
Update	**01/11/17 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):-** The deputy PCC has completed his review of the office structure. The existing controls remain in place whilst work continues with the additional controls. Recruitment is currently underway with new starters expected to be in post by January 2018. Force and interim staff will remain in place to ensure resilience until then. **Current status: controls tasked.**

OPCC1690	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with public		
Responsible Officer	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Politics/Legal	Previous Rating	Low (4)
Information	Failure to consult and engage with the public to a level necessary to enable understanding of the PCC role.		
Impact	Under Section 96 of the Police Act 1996 the PCC is responsible for ensuring that appropriate levels of consultation takes place so that representative views of all communities are collected in a form that can inform future strategies and decision making. Furthermore there is a legal duty to consult on the level of precept before this is set every year.		
Existing Controls	• Public consultation concerning Precept options up to 2021 • Commissioning Framework is aligned to Police and Crime Plan • Review Comms & Engagement arrangements to support new PCC's priorities • Web site presence and effective use • PCC actively meeting with community and stakeholders • Responding to individual public enquiries • Inherited relationships remain effective • Increase proactive use of website and other media • Communication and Engagement Plan 2016/17 • Stakeholder & Communications Engagement Strategy • Public consultation concerning precept options for 2016/17 • Actively foster positive relations with the media/press • Undertake consultation with the public and other stakeholders to inform the strategic police & crime plan • Report to SAB on Communications & Engagement • Review & update current website for the new PCC • Secure the appropriate capability and capacity to support the engagement process • Apply a proportionality mechanism for dealing with public enquiries to ensure best use of PCC time and resources		
Additional Controls	• Progress a equalities action plan following recent consultation • Communication and Engagement Plan 2017/18 to be developed to support Police and Crime Plan		
Update	**01/11/17 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):-** The risk impact has been changed from Medium to High. This is due to a lack of staff in the office to undertake consultation as there is no Chief Executive to drive this forward. There is recognition that the original consultation did not cover all groups. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

STR1940	Failure to meet 101 call handling target		
Responsible Officer	Jason Ross Chief Inspector - CMD	Impact/Likelihood	Low/High
Date Recorded	12/09/16	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Stakeholders/Reputation	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	The current 101 call handling performance is below the intended target for the number of calls answered. The force target stands at 80% of calls answered within 30 seconds, with Leicestershire achieving on average 65-70%. A comfort message has been added for when calls cannot be answered a new shift pattern has increased resilience of call handling staff.		
Impact	The risk is associated to the reputational impact of not answering calls to the police, albeit calls of a non-emergency nature.		
Existing Controls	• Force Performance Gold Group • CMD Monthly Performance Meeting • CMD Weekly Demand Meeting • Shift pattern review		
Update	**06/10/17 – Jason Ross:-** The controls remain in place and improvements have been seen in the performance of 101 call handling. As a result the overall risk identified has reduced, however performance continues to be monitored closely. **Current status: controlled**		

Risks archived since the last JARAP

STR1936	Impact of Tri-force Collaboration on local Change Programme		
Responsible Officer	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	30/06/16	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Finance	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	Following the Police and Crime Commissioner elections in May 2016 Leicestershire and Northamptonshire have two new elected Commissioners. A decision has been made with the 3 force Chief Constables and Commissioners to not continue with the Strategic Alliance but instead use the SA work to develop a Tri-force Collaborative Programme.		
Impact	Leicestershire Police Change Team are progressing projects to deliver savings. However, there is uncertainty with what collaboration will take place and therefore whether they will align to the work currently being undertaken by the localised Change Team. In turn this creates uncertainty in whether we will meet the projected savings required as an individual force.		
Existing Controls	• Existing Control Name • Adequate project management resourcing • Change Board • Blueprint 2020		
Update	**14/08/17 – Andy Elliott:-** It has now been agreed what is and is not included within the remit of the TFC. This now allows us to develop the local change programme. The Blueprint programme will be invigorated with the new developed business cases for longer term savings as well as Darwin (new operating model). **Current status: managed.**		

STR520	Governance of collaborative arrangements		
Responsible Officer	Adam Streets Chief Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	13/05/10	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	Low (3)
Information	The Force must ensure proper governance of collaborating arrangements. Without this governance the Force may be exposed to risks.		
Impact	Performance or financial impacts, arising from such arrangements without proper governance in place.		
Existing Controls	• Existing Control Name • Establishment Board • Regional & Sub Regional Programme Boards • Reporting to PDG • High Level representation - DCC Board		

Update	**08/08/17 – Adam Streets:-** This risk is fairly old and does not detail a present threat or opportunity to the force. Since the emergence of this risk there has been an increase in collaborative arrangements. Where there is a specific threat or opportunity these are highlighted separately within the register. **Current status: managed.**

STR1521		Criminal Behaviour/Impropriety by staff	
Responsible Officer	Simon Hurst Chief Inspector	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Medium
Date Recorded	05/07/12	Current Rating	Low (4)
Category	Stakeholders/Reputation	Previous Rating	Low (4)
Information	Following an HMIC visit, risks to the Force through impropriety and criminal conduct have been codified. The risk can be from any Police Officer, Staff Member or volunteer. There are a number of headline areas identified (1) Information leakage, both intentional and accidental, (2) gifts, gratuities and hospitality, (3) Business interests, debt management and notifiable associations (4) Vetting and disclosure - An integrity action plan was generated to provide measures to- educate staff, reduce opportunities, and improve detection of breaches. The action plan contained 45 aspects of risk with mitigation and control measures, which deals with all aspects of risk identified above and also recent legislative change within the arena of complaints and discipline (such as legally qualified chairs / public hearings).		
Impact	Any breach of the Policies may lead to a compromise of Operational Policing and will lead to a reduction of the Force reputation		
Existing Controls	• Intelligence Requirement and Control Strategy • Legal Services Meeting Review • Getting it Right First Time Meeting • Integrity Plan • Operation Fox • Force Anti-Corruption Unit • ACPO Lead. • Confidential Reporting Procedure • Publication of ACPO Gifts/Gratuities/Secondary employment • Statement of Ethics • Introduction and eventual embedding of the Code of Ethics • Communication Strategy • Identification of particular areas of threats • Vetting Project • Integrity Line • Individual Gold Groups • Policies • Legislative Control • Annual Review of Business Interests		
Update	**01/08/17 – Simon Hurst:-** My reason is that it is very much a risk that will always be present to one degree or another (much like crime in general). However, we have many mitigating features in place (from the mere presence of a PSD and Counter Corruption Unit, to processes and systems such as National and Local strategic assessments and a control strategy (all of which is regularly inspected by the HMIC / Ethics Committee etc). We have also invested in supportive and proactive technology (Protective Monitoring / Bad Apple confidential reporting etc), and have a robust link between vetting and counter corruption, coupled with a wealth of polices (debt management, notifiable association etc). I suggest SORB may consider that this is very much a matter of normal business and there are adequate mitigation processes and structures in place. **Current status: managed.**		

	Appendix B	Corporate Risk Register						20th November 2017	
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	Recorded	Last review	Priority	Previous rating
STR380	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) criteria.	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	January 2010	25/10/17	12	2
STR1844	Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Failure to transition to the ESN.	Very High	High	Managed	August 2014	13/11/17	12	12
STR473	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Security Vetting Manager	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO national vetting policy.	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	March 2010	15/11/17	12	12
STR2006	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Management of archive provision.	High	High	Control Tasked	October 2017	20/11/17	9	New Risk
OPCC1696	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	9	9
STR1679	Johnny Starbuck D/Superintendent	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	07/11/17	9	9
STR1954	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.	Very High	Medium	Managed	January 2017	17/08/17	8	8
STR1935	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Management of seized and found property provision.	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2016	10/10/17	8	9
STR1949	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	20/11/17	8	8
STR1961	Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager	Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system.	Very High	Medium	Managed	March 2017	06/11/17	8	8
STR1922	Chris Cockerill Operations Lead Criminal Justice	Inability to adequately audit Niche.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	October 2015	17/08/17	8	8
OPCC1694	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	6	9
STR1991	David Craig Head of IT	Threat of cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police.	High	Medium	Managed	June 2017	28/09/17	6	6
STR2009	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Reduced performance as a result of Force changes.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2017	06/11/17	6	New Risk
STR1948	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of LAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	03/11/17	6	6
STR1947	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of WAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2016	03/11/17	6	6
STR1953	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	13/09/17	6	6
STR1926	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Quality of video recorded evidence.	High	Medium	Controlled	January 2016	31/10/17	6	6

STR1939	Andrew Rodwell Communications Manager	Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.	High	Medium	Controlled	September 2016	20/11/17	6	6
STR420	Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety	Management system for energy use.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2010	03/11/17	6	6
STR1801	Alison Naylor HR Director	Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.	High	Medium	Controlled	June 2014	03/10/17	6	6
STR1329	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2012	20/11/17	6	6
STR1910	Jason Ross Contact Management	Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.	High	Medium	Controlled	August 2015	12/09/17	6	6
OPCC1690	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	6	4
STR1917	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the 'Building the Picture' HMIC recommendations.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	28/09/17	4	4
STR1946	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	November 2016	28/09/17	4	4
STR2008	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact of Darwin implementation.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2017	30/10/17	4	New Risk
STR1916	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	28/09/17	4	4
STR11	Alison Naylor HR Director	Potential for industrial action affecting our service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	October 2007	12/09/17	4	4
OPCC1700	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	4	4
STR508	Adam Streets Head of Corporate Services	Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	April 2010	20/11/17	4	4
STR1706	Alison Naylor HR Director	Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2013	12/09/17	4	4
STR533	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	The fair and effective use of stop and search to promote confidence.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2010	10/10/17	4	4
OPCC1698	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	4	4
OPCC1864	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2014	01/11/17	4	4
OPCC1699	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	4	4
STR2007	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Continuity of power supply to the FHQ site.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	October 2017	11/10/17	3	New Risk
STR1940	Jason Ross Chief Inspector CMD	Failure to meet 101 call handling target.	Medium	High	Controlled	September 2016	06/10/17	3	6
STR1764	David Craig Head of IT	Accreditation for the use of the PSN.	High	Low	Controlled	January 2014	20/11/17	3	3

STR564	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Management of MFH enquiries.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2010	31/10/17	3	3
STR1571	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.	High	Low	Managed	September 2012	31/10/17	3	3
STR458	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Failure to protect vulnerable persons.	High	Low	Controlled	March 2010	31/10/17	3	3
STR253	David Craig Head of IT	High risk of virus introduction and data loss.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2009	03/11/17	3	3
STR1990	David Craig Head of IT	Risk of uncertainty of impact of IT changes upon Leicestershire	Low	High	Controls Tasked	June 2017	20/09/17	3	3
STR1519	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	RMADS management for information security.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2012	28/09/17	2	4
STR1915	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	August 2015	28/09/17	2	2
STR430	Lynne Woodward Head of Equalities	Inquiry into disability related harassment.	Medium	Low	Managed	March 2010	02/11/17	2	2
STR1975	Carol Hever Head of HR	Gateway upgrade project.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	April 2017	02/11/17	2	New Risk
STR1623	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.	Medium	Low	Controlled	February 2013	20/11/17	2	2
STR310	David Sandall Head of Crime and Intelligence	Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'.	Low	Low	Controlled	November 2009	01/10/17	1	2
OPCC1695	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	1	1
STR1945	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Freedom of information requests – demand v capacity.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	November 2016	28/09/17	1	3
STR1475	Shane O'Neill Local Policing Lead	Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	May 2012	16/08/17	1	1

New risk	Risk of note

Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
	Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance/ Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction
Very High	4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force >1,000,000 Business area >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
High	3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force 251,000-1,000,000 Business area 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Medium	2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force 51,000-250,000 Business area 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Low	1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force <50,000 Business area <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood			
	Score		
Very High	4	>75% chance of occurrence	Almost certain to occur
High	3	51-75% chance of occurrence	More likely to occur than not
Medium	2	25-50% chance of occurrence	Fairly likely to occur
Low	1	<25% chance of occurrence	Unlikely to occur

Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16 = High
5 - 8   = Medium
1 - 4   = Low

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