POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL	**Paper Marked** # G

Report of	**OFFICE OF CHIEF CONSTABLE**
Subject	**FORCE RISK REGISTER**
Date	**MONDAY 17th APRIL 2023**
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Purpose of report

1. To provide JARAP with an update on the force strategic risk register, highlighting high priority risks, newly registered risks, changes of risk score and archived risks.

Recommendation

2. The panel is recommended to review the contents of this report and the updates provided within. Please note that all the updates and recommendations are subject to ratification at the Organisational Risk Board (ORB) on 24th March 2023 and are therefore subject to change.

Summary

3. There are currently 26 strategic risks on the risk register. There are also new risks that have not been added to the risk register as they have not yet been taken to ORB, but they are included in this report for information.

High Risks
4. 13 risks are currently rated as 'High' priority. All 26 risks are summarised in Appendix A.

Archived risks
5. 2 risks have been archived or are being proposed to be archived, since JARAP last met in January 2023. This is detailed in Appendix B.

Changes in risk score
6. 2 risks have had a change in risk score, or have a proposed change in risk score, since the last JARAP. These are detailed in Appendix C.

New risks
7. There have been 5 new risks, as per Appendix D since JARAP last met.

Risk Grading Criteria

8. The strategic risk register identifies the key strategic risks to the force. These risks typically represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 – 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a Risk Score, which is expressed as a Red/Amber/Green or 'RAG' rating. All strategic risks are reviewed at least quarterly.

Risk Score	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 – 16	High	3 Monthly
5 – 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 – 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk Status

10. The 'status' of a risk gives an indication of the extent to which the risk is being managed/controlled. The categories are detailed below:

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Keto risk management system, the term 'Pending Control' is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably 'controlled'.

Controlled – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review or a new risk to be reviewed for the first time or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Overview of Current Strategic risks

11. There are currently 26 strategic risks on the force risk register.

Risk Matrix Grid Chart:

	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Very High	0	0	5	2
High	0	1	1	5
Medium	0	0	4	4
Low	0	0	0	4

The above matrix may change when new risks, archived risks, and changes to risk score have been presented to ORB.

Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of force risk register

Appendix B: Archived risks

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

Appendix D: New risks

Appendix E: High priority risks not included in above appendices

Appendix F: Risk scoring matrix

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Appendix A: Risks Overview

Highlighting Legend:

Risks Archived / proposed archived since last JARAP (Jan 23)
Change to risk score
New risk since last meeting

Appendix A		Force Risk Register							17th APRIL 2023	
Reference	**Owner**	**Title**	**Impact**	**Likelihood**	**Status**	**First Recorded**	**Last review**	**Current/ proposed Risk Score**	**Previous Score**
STR0278	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	The Financial Challenge – 2022/2023 - 2025/26	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	September 2021	09/03/23	16	16
STR0081	David Craig Head of I.T	Capacity within I.T.	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	May 2019	20/03/23	16	16
STR0307	David Craig Head of I.T	Risk to network storage	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	February 2022	10/03/23	16	16
STR0127	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Inability to meet regional Occupational Health demand	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	January 2020	20/03/23	12	12
STR0187	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Churn of staff and ongoing establishment pressure	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	April 2020	20/03/23	12	12
STR0380	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Current JES non-equalities compliant and the implementation of new JES scheme carries risk	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	January 2010	09/03/23	12	12
STR0386	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Estates Department not being able to support essential building services	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	December 2008	09/03/23	12	New Risk
STR0411	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	October 2022	09/03/23	12	New Risk

ID	Owner	Risk			Status	Date	Review	Current	Previous
STR0339	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of cyber attack	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2022	20/03/23	12	12
STR0256	Shane O'Neill C/Supt - CaID	Safeguarding repeat domestic abuse victims	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	09/03/23	6	12
STR0258	Reme Gibson D/Supt CaID	Removal, retention and deletion of data in Digital Hub	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	June 2021	20/03/23	12	12
STR0383	Ch/Supt Shane O'Neill Head of CaID	Lack of PIP 2 detectives	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	June 2020	20/03/23	12	12
STR1679	Adam Streets ACC	Complying with Home Office Counting Rules & Ensuring High Levels of Crime Data Integrity	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	09/03/23	9	9
STR0257	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Risk of not providing appropriate health surveillance	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	20/03/23	8	8
STR0350	C/Insp Parkes Head of Transport Unit	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2022	13/03/23	12	8
STR0292	David Sandall DCC	Violence, abuse and intimidation against women and girls	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2021	20/03/23	8	8
STR0421	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of misconduct and complaints associated with the use of What'sApp	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	March 2023	20/03/23	8	New Risk
STR0291	David Sandall DCC	Impact of ISO standard for forensic science	High	Medium	Controls tasked	October 2021	17/03/23	6	6
STR0243	Dwight Barker C/Insp - SSD	Frequent failures with the Boxi system affecting the efficiency of the performance team	High	High	Controls Tasked	January 2021	07/03/23	6	6
STR0228	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Pension remedy for police pension scheme	High	Medium	Managed	December 2020	20/03/23	6	6
STR0280	David Sandall DCC	Appetite for regional collaboration	Medium	High	Controls Tasked	June 2021	07/03/23	4	6
STR0016	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Maintaining Workforce Wellbeing	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	November 2018	20/03/23	6	6
STR184	David Craig Head of IT	Loss of power or cooling affecting ability of IT and CMD to provide service	Very high	Low	Controls tasked	April 2020	20/03/23	4	4
STR2017	Steve Durrant Supt – CMD	Ineffective Communication of Firearms Markers to Deployed Officers	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	April 2018	09/03/23	4	4
STR0418	Rich Ward Supt - PSD	Predatory individual working for Leicestershire Police	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	20/03/23	4	New Risk

STR0419	Ch Supt Adam Slonecki Head of SSD	Safety and business continuity implications associated with use of lithium ion batteries	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	20/03/23	4	New Risk

Appendix B: Risks archived (or proposed to be archived) from the strategic risk register

Risk title	STR0256: Safeguarding repeat domestic abuse victims		
Responsible Officer	DCI Batchelor	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	6
Category	Community engagement and partnership	Previous Rating	12
Information	On 23 March 2021, police investigated the death of a female who had reported numerous incidents of domestic abuse by her partner, none of which were graded as High risk after July 2019. Her partner was subsequently charged with her murder. A statutory domestic homicide review and a PSD investigation have been commissioned in respect of the death. A rapid review of the incidents indicates themes of risk for the force within the identification and interpretation of risk over time (DASH), the effectiveness of safeguarding measures and the investigation into repeated medium and standard risk incidents of domestic abuse.		
Risk rationale	The effectiveness of Leicestershire Police in safeguarding repeat domestic abuse victims assessed at medium or standard risk, effectively mitigating the associated risk and effectively investigating such incidents.		
Existing Controls	Domestic Abuse policy and procedure MARAC referrals Adult Safeguarding Hub oversees and identifies repeat offences Review of repeat DA victims Force focus on medium risk investigation and outstanding suspects Op Farmer – daily monitoring of repeat DA victims		

	Dedicated review by Regional Review Unit Threat Assessment Unit Review of DA services to improve models of attendance, assessment and investigation Domestic abuse resolution team (DART)
Additional Control	Cultural change programme
Update	The 6-month review of the Force DA project has now been completed and reported at Executive Level. The introduction of the DART, the Threat Assessment Unit and increased resources to the DAIU are now embedded as business as usual and delivering against expected KPI's. A cultural change programme is ongoing through training and communications messages. The risk can be reduced to 6 and subject to ongoing review through the CAID risk register. This has been agreed with the project SRO D/Ch/Supt O'Neill. **Current status: March 2023 ORB to consider archiving to CAID risk register and reducing likelihood from 4 to 2, reducing risk from High to Medium.**

Risk title	**STR0243: Frequent failures of the BOXI system are having a significant effect on the efficiency of the performance team**		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	07/01/21	Current Rating	6
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	6
Information	As of April 26th, Boxi was currently running with a delay of 13 1/2 hours. It produces data sets which are incomplete, however, the fact that they are incomplete is not always apparent, reducing our confidence in the information being provided. These failures are occurring across forces. As an associated issue the reporting server had to be disconnected due to it becoming 18 hours behind real time. During this period we weren't able to conduct searches. Whilst this was the server rather		

	than BOXI itself, this was actually more problematic as this is the same server we use for Power BI. It might not just be a BOXI issue, and there may be other (or fundamental) issues elsewhere that are contributing to the BOXI errors. Reports are now starting to fail for Boxi and Power BI due to a lack of bandwidth. While reports are available, these often represent partial updates so we cannot be sure that the information is complete. Information relating to domestic abuse is not being provided to our partners in good time and in a reliable format.
Risk rationale	The Boxi system is failing several times per week. This is affecting the efficiency of our performance team as they are having to manually repeat extracts, sometimes multiple times. This is time consuming and inefficient. This also causes a risk that information won't be passed onto schools regarding domestic incidents and also that the project 360 teams will not be able to carry out follow up work with victims of domestic abuse.
Existing Controls	National guidance on better ways to construct searches Force project to improve how queries are written Expanding use of Power BI to reduce reliance on BOXI Gates are no longer on the same system as BOXI We reduce the frequency of searches and the time period being searched to reduce process time and reduce the likelihood of it failing Running reports at night to increase the likelihood of reports running Frequent review of the BOXI searches that crash Lincs Police can supply us with any large searches/reports that consume server usage Moved NICHE/BOXI to cloud based process Switching automated BOXI searches off to reduce the strain on the system BOXI upgrade
Additional Control	None

Update	Since the migration to the cloud (for niche) BOXI has ran a lot better and the reporting problems have been greatly improved with no complaints raised. We do have issues with Power BI failing (ironically as that was mitigation when BOXI was a risk), and general issues with IT failing that affects everything – but the actual BOXI risk is proposed close. There is a Team level risk already in place covering IT issues. **Current status: Given the general improvements, March 2023 ORB to consider archiving this risk**

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

Risk title	STR0350: Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet		
Responsible Officer	Ch Insp Parkes	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	14/02/23	Current Rating	12
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	8
Information	Leicestershire Police is seeking to transition to a fleet which does not use conventionally fuelled vehicles. This is being planned for sustainability reasons (to reduce our carbon footprint and to reduce our contribution to local air pollution) and to ensure business continuity (given the gradual phasing out of conventionally fuelled vehicles). The benefits to sustainability will be maximised if the electricity supplied is from renewable sources. There have been safety concerns raised in relation to electric vehicles both in their usage, especially when specific operational tactics are used and also during charging. There will need to be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment but there are also potential opportunity costs in bringing extensive electrical inputs onto our sites, especially as the force will need to transition to electric sources of heating rather than gas and these heating systems will reduce the amount of electricity that may need to be brought on site. We are aware that new conventionally fuelled vehicles will probably only be produced up until circa 2028.		

Risk rationale	There are potentially very high impacts to our strategic direction if busines continuity challenges are experienced as our service delivery and ability to respond will be undermined. There is also a high impact on the environment if the transition is not made. There are potentially high impacts to health and safety due to the fire risks associated with operational vehicle use plus the learning provided by the fire service regarding response to fires involving thermal runaway.
Existing Controls	Liaison with LFRS, Blue Light Commercial, Leicester Climate Change Emergency Partnership, driving school, Emergency Services Environmental and Sustainability Group Oversight of sponsored vehicles Trials of electric cars Vehicle replacement strategy Market research on vehicle charging technology Ongoing opportunities to increase the amount of renewable electricity for force premises
Additional Control	Charging infrastructure to be sited away from buildings Pricing for 10% renewable electricity being explored Vehicle tracking project to monitor vehicle usage Trials of demo vehicles in driving school Planning of future charging infrastructure included in future changes to car parks Service contracts will be included with installation of charging infrastructure Section 106 funding for 5 electric vehicles Bid for specific training courses for driving electric vehicles
Update	Revised Fire Protection Association guidance around charging electric vehicles has been released. The key points are: • Charging points will have to be included in the fire risk assessments

	- It's good practice to design all bays for the use of disabled people to combine inclusive access with the lateral separation of vehicles - Additional oversight must be given when vehicles are going to be charged overnight without many staff being on site - There needs to be suitable fire detection and warning installations in case of a fire, internal charging sites need significant warning systems and fire resisting structures - Provision of portable firefighting equipment - Staff to be trained in how to react to fires and correct methods of charging - Charging areas should have fire resisting construction or space separation - Charging points should have physical protection from collision - Rapid charging points should be differentiated from other types and standard plugs should never be used - Clearly marked emergency manual isolation should be provided at charging points which is clearly identified for firefighters and others - Clear separation requirements are stated for different applications Head of TU suggests there should be an increase in the likelihood because the transition will happen. The force is in the process of addressing this in terms of the infrastructure challenges. There will be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment required. It should also be noted that the cost of fuelling EVs is not necessarily that much cheaper than traditional fuels **Current status: March 2023 ORB to consider raising risk from medium (8) to High (12) because the transition will happen and will require significant investment.**

Risk title	STR0280: Risk to Regional Collaboration		
Responsible Officer	Sgt Dickens	Impact: 2	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	4
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	8
Information	We are currently positioned as the lead force in a number of collaborations. Our partners within these collaborations are considering their position in the future, risking business continuity.		

Risk rationale	In 2020 a HMIC national report entitled 'The Hard Yard' recommended that all forces should track benefits of being in a collaboration through an effective system. As force lead it places us into a vulnerable position, presenting a heightened risk relative to others, in particular, the financial impacts and our capacity to meet operational work demands.
Existing Controls	Benefits of collaboration Dedicated lead Team Leicestershire Academy
Additional Control	Understanding demand Awaiting methodology from NPCC on how to better track the benefits of collaborations. There has been previous guidance, but it needs greater clarity. This methodology, together with guidance from CoP and Home Office can be used to create something internally.
Update	Occupational Health and Criminal Justice no longer form part of our collaboration. We retain Academy/L&D, UCAS Forensic accreditation and EMSOU, so the risk still exists in two current formats: 1) Ensuring we are getting best value for money out of the current collaborations that we are keeping. 2) Ensuring that any future collaborations we consider are subject to scrutiny and due diligence to ensure that the collaboration would be right for Leicestershire. The risk is considered to now be low for these two areas. **Current status: March 2023 ORB to consider reduction in risk from Medium (6) to Low (4)**

Appendix D: New Risks

Risk title	STR0386: Risk of Estates Dept failing to support essential building services		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	04/12/08 (Risk was resurrected from archive risk register in Jan 23)	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Sudden loss of key staff from the Estates Department from illness, accident or resignation etc. This could cause the Force considerable disruption from a failure of any of our complex building services. SPOF include the electrical engineer and the mechanical engineer.		
Risk rationale	Estates relies on single points of failure due to level of expertise required and knowledge needed of force systems. It is not possible to employ additional staff as failure of our systems is rare or non-existent and there is insufficient work to keep them employed the remainder of their time.		
Existing Controls	Records of drawings and services High levels of planned maintenance Use of contractors BC Plan		
Additional Control	None		
Update	Risk accepted in Jan 2023 ORB. Unfortunately, our Electrical Services Engineer is still off sick and he has been for a couple of months. It looks unlikely he will be coming back. If we have a major electrical fault Estates currently have no staff to resolve this. **Current status: Risk score remains the same as Engineer remains off sick**		

Risk title	STR0411: Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	27/10/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The air conditioning system at Euston Street is working at 100% capacity. This system should be n+1 as a minimum meaning it should continue to function fully with the failure of half of the plant. This is how it was designed. So much additional IT equipment has been added, n+1 has been lost. If either half of the plant should fail or is taken down for servicing the temperature in the room rises rapidly. If it is not reinstated quickly this could lead to failure of the IT equipment held in the room. The plant is relatively old at about 8 years. If a major part is required and is not "off the shelf" this could take the system down for days.		
Risk rationale	Overheating could lead to complete failure in IT functionality across the force		
Existing Controls	Regular maintenance. A/C engineers on call. Funding approved within 23/24 Capital Programme		
Additional Control	Proposed more to Cloud system £300K investment proposed to restore n+1 functionality.		
Update	Risk accepted at Jan 2023 ORB. Funding has been approved and put in to the 23/24 Capital Programme. Design work is currently being carried out ready to go to tender. **Current status: Risk score unchanged until work has been completed.**		

Risk title	STR0421: Risk of misconduct and complaints associated with the use of What'sApp		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	17/03/23	Current Rating	8
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The use of Whatsapp was endorsed by the then DCC. It was authorised as a means of external engagement with specific groups and how been used in recent years for this purpose. We believed it is used extensively on force devices. We also believe that it is used directly with victims and for operational communication. There have been a number of issues raised with the use of Whatsapp however: IOPC published a report into the use of WhatsApp which is critical of its use NPCC Working Group identified 866 cases of misuse nationally involving WhatsApp over a 2 year period, they ultimately recommend moving away from WhatsApp especially for internal use and we should revisit external use. The Information Commissioner has recommended it not be used as the data is stored outside the EU and UK The law of access under Data Protection has expanded and Officers, Staff and MOP can all request access to messages sent about them. We have now had our first case involving a staff member in the VRN wanting access to Supervisors Text Messages Caselaw has expanded the right of access to cover usage of WhatsApp on a personal device where they are talking in a professional capacity. Potential for an increase in complaints or misconduct for inappropriate messages being sent involving either internal or external group chats – even where the officers are not actively engaging		
Risk rationale	The use of this app and potentially wider social media involves a risk of misconduct and complaints if inappropriate messaging has been used or challenges have not been made to such messaging.		
Existing Controls	Supervisors can view an officers' chat history Monitoring by Professional Standards		

	Installation of the app requires authorisation from Sgt or above
	Social Media Policy
Additional Control	PSD monitoring software
	Niche investigate
	Comms to staff not to use personal devices to talk about work issues
Update	Issue being discussed at Exec Group
	Current status: Risk sent to March 2023 ORB to be accepted.

Risk title	STR0418: Risk of a predatory individual working for Leicestershire Police posing a risk to other staff members or members of the public			
Responsible Officer	Supt Ward		Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	09/02/2023		Current Rating	4
Category	People		Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The HMICFRS published a review of vetting within the police service in November 2022. This was undertaken following the kidnap, rape and murder of Sarah Everard by Met PC Wayne Couzens in March 2021. There have been a number of other serious cases reported in the press following the Couzens case. The HMICFRS report identified a number of shortcomings within vetting for the police service in general. This concerned new joiners and transferees. Some individuals were allowed to join police forces despite having convictions, having significant debts or having family members that were involved in crime. Some individuals were able to join police forces without having face to face interviews or were able to transfer between forces despite having a significant history of complaints or allegations of misconduct.			

	There could be a significant risk to staff and the public as well as reputational risk to Leicestershire Police if an individual of this type was able to be employed. There could also be significant ramifications in the public's confidence in our service and willingness to report crime to us.
Risk rationale	Police officers are in a position to misuse power and frequently come into contact with vulnerable people. We need to remain vigilant and maintain our control measures to ensure that we do not employ an individual who falls far below the standards of professional behaviour required of and demonstrated by members of Leicestershire Police.
Existing Controls	Bad Apple scheme Briefings on standards of professional behaviour NPCC data wash to identify any non-disclosed offences Grievance process Comms strategy regarding use of social media Vetting undertaken in compliance with APP Quarterly reminders to update details for vetting MV and SC clearance reviewed annually Comms campaign on 10 standards of professional behaviour Vetting of transferees Training on behaviour standards provided to all new officers, specials, PCSOs Vetting interview candidates if needed Drug testing Light touch vetting of cadets Bullying and harassment policy

	PSD investigation into allegations and complaints
	Counter Corruption Unit
Additional Control	Internal 'crimestoppers' line to anonymously reports issues of integrity
	Introduction of annual integrity checks
	PDR to be updated to prompt staff to notify us of changes
Update	**Current status: March 2023 ORB to ratify new risk**

Risk title	STR0417: Safety and business continuity implications associated with a greater use of lithium ion batteries		
Responsible Officer	Ch/Supt Slonecki	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	14/02/2023	Current Rating	4
Category	Operation	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Lithium batteries will be found in electric cars, escooters and ebikes as well as building energy storage systems. Fires could take place due to thermal runaway, a process whereby the heat is generated in an uncontrollable fashion and reaches a point where it cannot be stopped without substantial cooling. A fire involves numerous toxic and explosive gases and is extremely difficult to fight as the cell that is affected would have to have water applied directly to it. These cells are generally encased in significant amounts of metals and plastic and are every difficult to access. An electric car would be at risk of reignition for up to 3 weeks after a fire or even a collision (as physical impact can be another factor leading to fire). Fires of this type have the potential to destabilise structures and due to the energy involved, have strong direction flames that can easily cause fires elsewhere. Battery control systems are very limited in some batteries, especially those for escooters. This means that charging may not cut off when the battery is fully charged. This is a problem as batteries are less stable when reaching full charge. There have been numerous fires involving these. London Fire Brigade fights one fire per day arising from this. There is very little regulation		

around this issue and fire services have encountered numerous situations where members of the public have recycled batteries for e scooters.

The key areas of concern for the organisation would involve:-

- Operational response – implications include the flame, inhalation and explosive risks around vehicle fires, electrocution risks which rise significantly if there is extensive damage to the vehicle, risks of skin damage and exposure to hazardous chemicals. These are key safety risks but they may also interfere with our ability to gather evidence at scenes.

- Time that a road will be closed for - due to the risk of reignition and the difficulties in fighting fires this would now be significantly longer than for a conventionally fuelled vehicle fire.

- Significant resource implications if the force has to support LFRS at a grid scale battery storage fire.

- Implications for our own buildings and business continuity - battery storage systems are placed in buildings to allow business continuity but may potentially be the cause of a BC event in the case of fire. The storage and use of these systems will have to be carefully assessed due to their implications of the fire risk assessment and means of escape.

- Implications for the electrification of the fleet – the distance between vehicles being charged or parked and between those vehicles and buildings is important (especially given the potential for bi-direction charging in the future) and also the fact that rapid charging is more harmful for the battery.

- The safety implications of electric batteries stored in evidence.

	• Reliability of vehicle recovery firms.
	• Storage of our own electric bikes.
	• Implications for the wider use of lithium-ion batteries to progress sustainability.
	• The need to provide general information for staff regarding safety away from work.
	• The potential for lithium ion batteries to be deliberately abused to create fires especially on aircraft.
Risk rationale	The use of Lithium-ion batteries is becoming more and more commonplace. These batteries are very efficient and allow for lots of energy to be stored in a small space. While this is a major advantage, it also means that the consequences of a fire would be very significant if energy is released through thermal runaway.
Existing Controls	None
Additional Control	None
Update	**Current status: March 2023 ORB to ratify new risk.**

Appendix E: High Priority Risks (Red)

Risk title	STR0081: Capacity within IT		
Responsible Officer	David Craig	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	28/06/19	Current Rating	16
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	16
Information	IT Department may not have capacity to support the delivery of digital transformation for the Force.		
Risk rationale	There are also increasing security incidents that impact on the capacity within IT. This could hinder progressive initiatives, impact strategic objectives and affect the reputation of the Force.		
Existing Controls	IT Department work programme Digital Futures Board Design authority Change Team Programme Management Project Management Market Supplements External resource Scheduling and prioritisation process Creation of Digital Optimisation and Innovation team		
Additional Control	Review of IT, Digital and Data Delivery Restructuring of Comms and Support Section		

	Review of job descriptions
Update	The IT Review and TOM has been agreed by Exec Group. We now move into planning of the implementation phase. Implementation will be a phased delivery. The score of this risk will be reviewed as we move through each phase anticipating that the risk will reduce as phases are completed and milestones achieved. **Current status: Risk score unchanged until new staff have been recruited**

Risk title	STR0278: The Financial Challenge – 2022/23 – 2025/26		
Responsible Officer	Paul Dawkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	16
Category	Finance	Previous Rating	16
Information	The overall MTFP position has deteriorated further. The police officer and staff 2022 pay awards have significantly increased pay inflation cost pressures across the MTFP period 2022/27. The Force is also experiencing higher than forecast non pay inflation and considerable unbudgeted costs in relation to Op Energy (although Home Office funding of up to 85% of these costs should be forthcoming at the year end). Despite the PCC raising Band D precept by £15 for 2023/24 only, current assumptions indicate the MTFP will not balance through to 2027. The use of reserves and identification of £3.9m cashable efficiency savings will be required in 2023/24. This is will be managed through the Investments, Savings & Productivity Board, chaired by the DCC.		
Risk rationale	The Force continues to face a number of challenges relating to its financial position for the MTFP period 2022/27. These originate from unavoidable service expenditure, cost pressures, staff related contractual pressures and pay and non pay inflationary concerns. In recent months the overall MTFP position has markedly deteriorated. The MTFP will continue to be reviewed each quarter.		
Existing Controls	Strategy and oversight		

	Budget review
	Investments, Savings & Productivity Board (chaired by the DCC)
Additional Control	Ongoing review
	Considering funding implications for pay awards
Update	Risk information has been updated and anew existing control added – Investments, Savings and Productivity Board.
	Current status: Risk score unchanged. Given the further deterioration of the overall MTFP position, the score has remained high.

Risk title	STR0127: Inability to meet regional occupational health demand		
Responsible Officer	Tim Ellis	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	18/01/20	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	The unit is currently carrying a number of vacancies. There is a national shortage of occupational health nurses and the force has to compete with the salaries offered in the public sector. The unit reflects the generally aging demographic within occupational health is also affected by an aging workforce in that 12 members of staff that are over 60, this creates an increased risk of staff turnover. Deputy retired and is not being replaced due to disaggregation which will happen 1st April 2023. Head of Occupational Health going to Nottinghamshire Police force after 26th October and no Head for the collaboration has been recruited. Lincolnshire leave the collaboration 1st October 2022. Admin Manager for North decided to transfer to Lincs with a TUPE like agreement.		
Risk rationale	The regional demand for Occupational Health services is outweighing the capacity of the unit. This will have wide-reaching impacts if it continues, from Officer wellbeing through to reputational risk. Police role and salaries are not attractive in the current market.		
Existing Controls	Creation of student placements.		

	Market supplement for OHN roles to maintain salaries after Hay review.
	Use of agency staff
	Recruited 1 FTE nurse for Leicester, 1 FTE screening nurse in OH training post for Notts;
	Business manager role continues and will take on line management of administrators in the North.
Additional Control	Identifying how cancellations can be reduced
	Increased staffing levels suggested for post disaggregation to increase resilience and meet demands
	Go Live for new case management system
	Looking at where staffing levels can be increased. Student placements have been created and business manager role will take on the line management of administrators in the North.
	New head of department joining Jan 23.
Update	The Regional OHU will disaggregate in April 23 creating a Leics OH. The new OH and Wellbeing Head joined in Jan 23. There are still difficulties recruiting the staff needed with the correct experience and qualifications, and interest in vacancies is low. The Case Management System was due in Dec 22 but has been delayed and complaints have been made to the provider. There is not yet a new implementation date. **Current status: Risk score unchanged because recruitment is ongoing and delay in Case Management System. Risk may rise if these issues remain over the next 3-6 months.**

Risk title	STR0187: Churn of staff and ongoing establishment pressure		
Responsible Officer	Alastair Kelly	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	18/04/20	Current Rating	12
Category	Leadership and Strategic Planning	Previous Rating	12

Information	There is pressure on staff movements with a long term 42% churn of staff. There will be 50% of staff with less than 4 years' experience. Induction, training and promotion models will need to change.
Risk rationale	This attrition in itself had threats to skill capacity but is compounded by large intakes of new recruits and the resources required to train them.
Existing Controls	Strategic Establishment and Resourcing Board Governance Boards Target Operating Model Volunteer support Organisational Risk Assessment (ORA) Development of Police Academy Mentors and tutors Recruitment strategy Change Team Analysis Workforce Engagement Strategy PC to Sgt development programme Police Officer Vacancy Dashboard Mapping of Police Officer and Staff Vacancies against Establishment
Additional Control	Managing the national uplift of police officers Improving technologies Improving skills

	Management and Leadership Apprenticeships
Update	<u>Employment experience</u> Menopausal Project – support, toolkits, menopause cafes Focus Group on key issues faced by women in senior police roles Cost of Living focus in Wellbeing meetings <u>Workforce engagement</u> Workforce survey being completed <u>Commitment to inclusion</u> Sexism/misogyny – HMI report in Met – detail being monitored for possible impact on our policies/procedures Further neurodiversity conference in April 23 <u>Pipeline</u> Police Uplift Programme – final month of 3 year project. On target to exceed target and hit additional recruitment targets. From 2023/24 aim will be to maintain numbers. Home Office have confirmed there will be financial penalties for not maintain with 6 month check points. LSTO/PCSO recruitment ongoing Future leaders programme running Mini Police Project launched – positive feedback <u>Careers/Academy/Resourcing</u> Additional Executive roles in place - Head of Academy and Head of HR roles

Plus new Head of Occupational Health and Wellbeing in place working through disaggregation of the service from the regional structure.

Using IPLDP+ route of entry (and continuing PCDA) pending the creation of a fourth route of entry into policing following Home Secretary announcement

HR Service Development

Continue to monitor and review the new joiner experience.

Police Staff Recruitment Review: Trialling use of more 'subject' to Offers once vetting completed. Now using Power BI enabled tracking tool to identify bottlenecks in processes and improve experience for applicants, appointing managers and HR.

Current status: No change to risk score given the ongoing mitigation.

Risk title	STR0383: Lack of PIP 2 Detectives due to lack of staff and training affecting capability		
Responsible Officer	D/Ch/Supt O'Neill	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	15/06/2020	Current Rating	12
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	12
Information	The lack of PIP2 qualified detectives has been identified as a national issue, and it is having a significant impact within the CAID departments. The number of PIP 2 qualified detectives within CAID sits at only 55% of the allocated establishment (198 of the 356 that should be in place).		
Risk rationale	CAID should have 356 detectives in place - but currently only has 198		
Existing Controls	Process in place for CID Aides (PC to DC Process). Process takes 14-18 months. The pool of officers being recruited from are increasingly young in service. Initial findings are positive, very few officers within their initial 6 months that have returned back to area. However CID Aides volunteering have reduced.		

	DHEP Program is underway for direct entry detectives, first cohort started Nov 21, and joining CID and CAID depts in Sept 22. Two further DHEP cohorts have been agreed by SERB and will take start in April/ May 2022 and Nov 2022.
	PC to DC recruitment process restarted June 2022
	6) CID attachments (PIP 1) part of Resource Cell Plan - eliminate 4 week attachments. D/Supt Baker has asked resource planners not to book in individuals with leave/ courses etc. Expected to go to 4 month attachment on 2nd year in CID, 3rd year in Serious Crime. Structured attachments are due for sign off at Force Exec.
	SERB - seeking to identify and implement force support around placements of officers in the DCs gaps in the period it takes to train DCs. PIP 1 investigators have been deployed into other CAID depts to assist with vacancies - mitigating the skills drain from CID.
	Review of work allocation in CAIU has been completed - some investigations will be allocated to PC attachments
Additional Control	Adopt a more agile approach to backfilling existing staff on area to allow them to attend courses.
	Identification of the requirement to futureproof the interest shown, and ongoing requirement to promote detective process. An improved approach to seek direct approach to teams and individuals, with personalised inputs and engagements to enhance and motivate interest in individuals becoming, and remaining Detectives.
	Force looking to recruit temporary capacity for 2 years to support inexperienced staff. This is being managed by the Resource Board
Update	A third cohort of Dc DHEP started in November 2022 – 33 in number.
	The structured attachments have started in 2023 assisting with development of staff and showcasing the work of investigators to the wider force to attract new detectives.
	Current status: Risk score unchanged. The risk remains the same until numbers start increasing and that is predicted in the next 6-12 months.

Risk title	STR0339: Risk of a successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	26/07/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Intelligence, Information Management and Security	Previous Rating	12
Information	A successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police may result in the serious compromise of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information systems, services and assets of the force, potentially hindering operational effectiveness. Attacks can vary in nature and extent such as, malicious software or may include phishing, advanced persistent threats, social engineering and hacking. Attacks may or may not be targeted on the force and may be perpetrated by foreign national governments, terrorists, organised crime groups, hackers or employees. Depending upon the sophistication and scale of attack, there will be varying impacts that may include denial of service, loss or disclosure of information/data and the loss of ability to share information and potentially threatening operational effectiveness leading to harm and reputational damage. There can also be system or application downtime and potential legal consequences. The force has recently fallen victim to a number of phishing emails. The Force has also been contacted by partner agencies who have had their systems compromised which have held Police data. Blocking email addresses is one of our main defences, however, these emails will originate from email addresses that we regularly use and would have little reason to regard as suspicious. Many of these partner organisations correspond with senior members of staff.		
Risk rationale	Impact scored at a 4 because there would be major impact on ability to fulfil strategic objectives, major stakeholder concerns and major disruption to service delivery. Likelihood scored at a 3 because there is 51-75% chance of a cyber-attack. It is more likely to occur than not.		
Existing Controls	Gold Group set up under Op Chocaholic for cyber attacks from 3rd party emails Staff guidance, training and awareness Assistance from the NMC with cyber related incidents POLWARP reporting system		

	Annual Accreditation processes for PSN, PSNP, Cyber Essentials and Airwave
	Mail marshall and firewalls for email correspondence and browsing
	Technical internal control procedures such as hardening, patching, control of malicious software and passwords
	Annual IT health checks
	Recruitment procedures including vetting, authorization, access management and leavers
	Management of contractors and volunteers
	Physical security of buildings and assets
	Liaison Between I.T and Information Security
	PSD Protective monitoring including monitoring, auditing and reporting capability
	GDPR compliance
	Security Incident Management Procedure
	Cyber Incident Response Training
	Partnered working with Cyber Crime
	Engagement with the local LRF
	Engagement with National Cyber Working Group
Additional Control	Investigating what further controls can be introduce
	Planning an audit on how department heads manage cyber security within BC Plans
	Detailed list of all valuable assets
	Define a strategy for IT infrastructure enhancements

	Improved procedures around cyber incidents Playbooks in development stage Oversight from NMC
Update	The Force is in the process of ensuring that all users are onboarded to O365. CMD still remain due to some issues. CMD is due to be completed by the end of March 2023. With regards to Win 10 1809 migration, this will depend on if the update from 1809 to 21H2 can be automated. If it cannot be automated then there is a schedule which replaces or upgrades them all by the end of March 2024. The Force needs to upgrade all devices to ensure that they remain in support and vulnerabilities can be mitigated. **Current status: Risk score unchanged at this stage, but the additional controls may reduce the likelihood next time if some have been completed**

Risk title	STR0258: Removal, retention and deletion of data in Digital Hub		
Responsible Officer	D/Supt Gibson	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	12
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	12
Information	Currently there is excessive retention of data with infrequent deletion of material. Volume of data stored and acquired from mobile devices constantly increasing, and has become a National Issue. Legacy data is stored in various formats, both hardware storage (significant amount of historical data) and on premises digital storage. This is putting a significant burden on, and exposes the Force to, compliance risks. Current concerns regarding the amount, understanding and requirement of data currently held by the Force. Requirement to triage data stored and remove data that is no longer required, and implement a robust audit regime, with potential to incorporate a level of automation.		

Risk rationale	Current digital information storage systems are affecting compliance with CPIA and MoPI requirements
Existing Controls	Advice received from records manager DPIA Force Data Storage Board Use of Evidence and Property Archive Centre (EPAC) Published 'Management of Physical and Digital Evidence' guidance Published 'Retention, Storage and Destruction of Materials and Records relating to Forensic Examinations' document
Additional Control	- Business case submitted to exec for Digital Forensic Transformation Project, with final decision imminent. This proposal provides a forward facing RRD solution for all new data ingested into the new DF network form day 1 of go live. N.B. even if agreed at exec a procurement and implementation process will be require to deliver this highly technical proposal. - There is now a RRD Gold group which meets monthly, and is responsible for the implementation / co-ordination of solutions to resolve the legacy data issue. - In conjunction RRD Gold the DFU are about to embark upon a review of legacy Z-Drive data with the goal of deleting data no longer required, and restructuring data for retention to facilitate effective future review.
Update	**Current status: Risk score is unchanged as these have not yet become existing controls.**

Risk title	STR380: Implementation of the Job Evaluation Scheme		
Responsible Officer	Colette Cloete	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	The Equal Pay Audit requires consideration for a different and suitable JES. Following consultation the Force made the decision to implement the Hay Scheme. This has resulted in the development of a new Pay Model which cannot be cost prohibited but was not commissioned for cost saving purposes.		

	If we do implement the HAY scheme some staff will have a reduction in pay, some will have an uplift and others will see no change. Other contractual terms such as A-L entitlement connected to rates of pay may also be affected. Industry consultants have confirmed that to re-design the current scheme would take so much work we would be better to select a scheme off the shelf, which HAY allows. There is a risk regarding the purple book scheme as due to staff departures, there are only 6 purple book evaluators within the force. 3 staff are required to grade each role, one to first grade and two to second grade and a further independent grader is required in the event of an appeal. This creates significant demand on these roles, all of which sit in HR.
Risk rationale	If we do not implement a new JES we will have an out-of-date scheme that does not meet with Equality criteria, and any claims could be substantial. Not implementing it can also carry an issue of having jobs evaluated against an old and a new scheme, creating excessive resource demand. Increasing delays also risk lower morale and reputation.
Existing Controls	Project plan and dedicated management Regular consultation Gold group provides governance, with Silver group feeding into it AWE design completed Costings included in the medium-term financial plan Data set for pay modelling completed
Additional Control	Ongoing employee support and communication
Update	• Pay modelling complete. • Updated Data Set being prepared to provide up-to-date costs for pay model. • Employer Offer being developed • Next JE GOLD Meeting is Friday 17th March. • Risk could change as we move into the implementation stages and staff receive project outcomes in relation to their posts.

	Becky Milligan will be taking the JE Project forwards from April. **Current status: Risk score remains the same. There is no change to the risk until we move in to the implementation phase.**

Risk title	STR0307: Risk to network storage		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	14/01/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	12
Information	As part of the Force's Digital Futures Program the infrastructure of our network is changing and will eventually migrate to a predominantly cloud based storage solution. Once delivered this will put Leicestershire Police at the forefront of digital policing and innovation. In the interim, Leicestershire Police are still required to support our current network infrastructure which has been placed under significant pressure from a number of national and local issues. These issues culminated in our Network approaching 98% capacity which triggered a chain reaction of performance related issues, although our operational capabilities were maintained throughout.		
Risk rationale	Effective records management is a legal requirement for all public authorities under the terms of the Data Protection Act 2018. Accordingly, we are obliged to have processes and procedures in place that govern our collection, retention and deletion of data that is held within our Force network.		
Existing Controls	Gold group governance Current network capacity Long term digital growth strategy and road map Financial investment		
Additional Control	Data deletion		

	Reclaim storage space
	Discussing new Digital and Data Team
	Plans to set a 1000 day maximum automatic retention period to reduce data consumed by Spectre and Veriato Protective Monitoring Software saving 50TB of storage.
Update	Due to the data cleansing processes that have been implemented since Jan 23, we are now forecast to hit maximum network capacity by Sept 2023 instead of March 2023. The data cleansing processes continue to be priority for the digital data/records management dept. **Current status: No change in risk score due to the forecast capacity limit.**

Risk title	STR1679: Complying with Home Office Counting Rules		
Responsible Officer	Darren Goddard	Impact: 3	Likelihood:3
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	In 2018 HMICFRS revisited the Force to complete a detailed crime data integrity (CDI) inspection. The subsequent report released in Feb 2019 assessed the Force's overall crime recording processes as 'Inadequate'. There was significant improvement from the previous inspection completed in 2017. Due to this assessment CDI and Home Office Counting Rules Compliance remains a key Strategic risk for the Force.		
Risk rationale	The force is required to comply with Home Office counting rules. PEEL assessment graded the force as outstanding for crime recording within the victim service assessment. However, our local audits and DDM reviews show that performance is on a downward trend.		
Existing Controls	CDI Board and CDI training Audit regime		

	NPCC Lead Increase in DDM staff
Additional Control	A new CDI delivery plan is being developed which will incorporate the feedback from HMICFRS's Victim Service Assessment
Update	Performance continues to be managed through the CDI meeting. The Audit Team are looking at a business insight model. Colleagues in LPD have recently produced some bite sized videos on the principal crime rule; finished incident rule; one victim one crime rule and the exceptions. These have been published on the intranet and digital academy; and will be promoted through shift briefs. Nationally there is a review of the Home Office Counting Rules with a view of simplifying the rules and this may help drive up performance, any changes will be implemented in April and October. **Current status: Risk score unchanged. This is there has not yet been an improvement in performance as work continues.**

Appendix F - Risk Scoring Matrix

	Impact					
Score	**Performance/ Service Delivery**	**Finance /Efficiency £**	**Confidence/Reputation**	**Health and Safety**	**Environment**	**Strategic Direction**
4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: >1,000,000 Business area: >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: 251,000- 1,000,000 Business area: 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24- hours hospitalisation and /or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force: 51,000-250,000 Business area: 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital / professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force: <50,000 Business area: <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

OFFICIAL

Likelihood		
	Score	**Chance of Occurrence**
Very High	4	>75% (almost certain to occur)
High	3	51-75% (more likely to occur than not)
Medium	2	25-50% (fairly likely to occur)
Low	1	<25% (unlikely to occur)

Overall Risk Rating
Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16   =   High
5 - 8   =   Medium
1 - 4   =   Low