

**POLICE & CRIME  
COMMISSIONER FOR  
LEICESTERSHIRE  
JOINT AUDIT, RISK &  
ASSURANCE PANEL**

Paper

Marked



Report of	OFFICE OF CHIEF CONSTABLE
Subject	FORCE RISK REGISTER
Date	THURSDAY 1 <sup>ST</sup> AUGUST 2024
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### **Purpose of report**

1. To provide JARAP with an update on the force strategic risk register, highlighting high priority risks, newly registered risks, changes of risk score and archived risks.

### **Recommendation**

2. The panel is recommended to review the contents of this report and the updates provided within. These updates will be reviewed at the Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB), due to meet on 13<sup>th</sup> August 2024 (JARAP risk report written on 10<sup>th</sup> July 2024 and accurate as at this date).

### **Summary**

3. There are currently 25 strategic risks on the risk register.

### **High Risks**

4. 10 risks are currently rated as 'High' priority. All 25 risks are summarised in Appendix A, as well as those that have been archived or proposed to be archived at SORB.

### **Archived risks**

5. One risk have been proposed for archived since the last JARAP, detailed in Appendix B.

### **Changes in risk score**

6. 7 risks have either had a change in risk score at the last SORB meeting in May 2024, or are proposed to have a change in risk score at the next SORB meeting in August 2024. These are detailed in Appendix C.

### **New risks**

7. There are 3 new risks, as per Appendix D.

### **Risk Grading Criteria**

8. The strategic risk register identifies the key strategic risks to the force. These risks typically represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

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9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 – 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a Risk Score, which is expressed as a Red/Amber/Green or ‘RAG’ rating. All strategic risks are reviewed at least quarterly.

Risk Score	‘RAG’ Rating	Review
9 – 16	High	3 Monthly
5 – 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 – 4	Low	3 Monthly

**Risk Status**

10. The ‘status’ of a risk gives an indication of the extent to which the risk is being managed/controlled. The categories are detailed below:

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Keto risk management system, the term ‘Pending Control’ is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably ‘controlled’.

Controlled – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review or a new risk to be reviewed for the first time or a risk transferred to a new ‘Responsible Officer’.

**Risk Matrix Grid Chart:**

	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Very High	0	1	0	0
High	0	1	3	7
Medium	0	1	4	6
Low	0	0	1	1

**Appendices**

Appendix A: Summary of force risk register

Appendix B: Archived risks

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

Appendix D: New risks

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Appendix E: High priority risks not included in above appendices.

Appendix F: Risk scoring matrix.

### **Persons to contact**

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Appendix A: Risks Overview

Highlighting Legend:

Risks Archived / proposed archived since last JARAP (Apr 24)
Change to risk score
Proposed new risk since last meeting

Appendix A		Force Risk Register				1 <sup>st</sup> AUGUST 2024			
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	First Recorded	Last review	Current/ proposed Risk Score	Previous Score
STR0278	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	The Financial Challenge – 2024/2025 - 2027/28	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	September 2021	July 2024	12	16
STR0081	David Craig Head of I.T	Capacity within I.T.	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	May 2019	July 2024	12	16
STR0184	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Inability to maintain the power that sustains IT systems and CMD	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	April 2020	July 2024	12	New Risk
STR0490	Steve Morris Head of Data Management	Lack of security testing and confidence in the Promaps system	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2024	July 2024	12	New Risk
STR0339	Steve Morris Head of Data Management	Risk of cyber attack	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2022	July 2024	12	12
STR0411	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	October 2022	July 2024	12	12
STR0448	Supt Tompkins Head of PSD	Year-on-year increase in complaints from members of the public	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2023	July 2024	12	12

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STR0350	C/Insp Parkes Head of Transport Unit	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet	High	High	Controls Tasked	September 2022	July 2024	9	9
STR0383	Ch/Supt Ward Head of CaID	Lack of PIP 2 detectives	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2020	July 2024	9	9
STR0380	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Current JES non-equalities compliant and the implementation of new JES scheme carries risk	High	High	Controls Tasked	January 2010	July 2024	9	6
STR0257	Matt Jones Head of SSR	Lack of technical H&S risk assessments	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	July 2024	8	8
STR0292	David Sandall DCC	Violence, abuse and intimidation against women and girls	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2021	July 2024	8	12
STR0470	David Craig Head of I.T	Failure of IT Server Affecting Cyclops Database	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2024	July 2024	8	12
STR0450	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Inability to recruit and retain police staff	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2023	July 2024	8	8
STR0453	Leah Johnson Head of Criminal Justice	Nano cell panels sending incorrect information	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2023	July 2024	8	8
STR0459	Ch/Supt Maxwell Head of SSD	H&S Skill development within Safety, Sustainability and Risk	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	Sept 2023	July 2024	8	8
STR0489	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Delays in vetting halting major projects	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	June 2024	July 2024	8	New Risk
STR0449	Adam Streets ACC	CMD demand and performance challenges	Medium	High	Controls Tasked	July 2023	July 2024	6	4
STR0307	David Craig Head of I.T	Risk to network storage	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2022	July 2024	6	8
STR0291	Adam Streets ACC	Impact of ISO standard for forensic science	High	Medium	Controls tasked	October 2021	July 2024	6	6
STR0457	Ch/Insp Gorman SSD	SNAP survey software no longer supported	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2023	July 2024	6	6
STR0228	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Pension remedy for police pension scheme	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2020	July 2024	6	6
STR1679	Adam Streets ACC	Complying with Home Office Counting Rules & Ensuring High Levels of Crime Data Integrity	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2013	July 2024	4	4
STR0419	Ch/Supt Maxwell Head of SSD	Safety and business continuity implications associated with use of lithium-ion batteries	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	July 2024	4	4

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STR0443	Leah Johnson Head of Prosecutions	Backlog of traffic interviews	High	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2023	July 2024	3	3
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**Appendix B: Risks archived or proposed to be archived from the strategic risk register**

STR0457	Risk that the SNAP survey software will fail as it is no longer supported		
Responsible Officer	Lindsey Hadley	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	14/09/23	Current Rating	6
Category	Digital	Previous Rating	6
Information	Leicestershire Police use 'SNAP' software to survey the public. We carry out these surveys for 15 other forces as well. This software is no longer supported by the developers as the IT department have not upgraded to the new version.		
Risk rationale	There is a risk that this will compromise surveying if the system encounters a problem that our IT department can't fix it as we cannot rely on support from the software developer. This will result in reputational damage to the organisation from the lack of surveying as well as reputational and financial damage as it will not be able to continue undertaking surveys on behalf of other forces.		
Existing Controls	Request made to IT to upgrade the system. Paper sent to IT Change Board.		
Additional Control	None		
Update	This is no longer a strategic risk. We are currently working with IT and SNAP to install the new version of the software. <b>Current status: Next SORB (Aug 24) to consider archiving this risk.</b>		

## Appendix C: Changes in risk score

STR0278	The Financial Challenge – 2024/25 – 2027/28		
Responsible Officer	Paul Dawkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	12
Category	Finance	Previous Rating	16
Information	<p>The overall MTFP position has improved as a consequence of decisions taken to reduce both pay and non-pay expenditure in line with the Force's 3 year Transformation &amp; Budget Sustainability Plan 2023/26. The police officer and staff pay awards for September 2022 and 2023 have significantly increased pay inflation cost pressures across the current MTFP period 2024/28, as the awards are only part funded by the Home Office resulting in £7.1m shortfall in 2024/25. The Force continues to experience significant non-pay inflation and unbudgeted costs, particularly in relation to the seizure of dangerous dogs. The Force is on track to achieve a balanced budget in 2024/25 through the delivery of £8.6m cashable savings. The MTFP will be continually reviewed by the Force Executive Group, chaired by the CC.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>The Force faces a number of challenges relating to its financial position for the current MTFP period 2024/28. These originate from unfunded pay and non-pay inflationary cost pressures. In recent months, the overall MTFP position has improved. The MTFP will continue to be reviewed each quarter.</p>		
Risk consequence	<p>This risk still has the potential to impact on the financial resources necessary to meet both the level 5a Finance Strategic Performance Indicators, as well as the Force's strategic priorities; ultimately to deliver the police pledge.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>Strategy and oversight</p> <p>Budget review</p> <p>Executive Group (chaired by the CC)</p>		
Additional Control	<p>Ongoing review</p> <p>Considering funding implications for pay awards</p>		

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Update	<b>Current status: Discussed at last SORB (May 24) and suggested that the risk has reduced as there are clear plans in place to mitigate the risk. Specific areas of work are planned, on track and aligned to our strategic plan.</b>
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STR0081	Capacity within IT		
Responsible Officer	David Craig	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	28/06/19	Current Rating	12
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	16
Information	IT Department may not have capacity to support the delivery of digital transformation for the Force.		
Risk rationale	There are also increasing security incidents that impact on the capacity within IT. This could hinder progressive initiatives, impact strategic objectives and affect the reputation of the Force.		
Risk consequence	<p>Potential failure to meet our pledge by not being able to fully invest in technology.</p> <p>Possible impacts on our strategic priorities by affecting our service, delaying efficiency, increasing demand and not being able to maximise technology.</p> <p>Increased likelihood of delays to all Level 5a Strategic Performance Indicators.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>IT Department work programme</p> <p>Digital Futures Board</p> <p>Force Programme Management</p> <p>Review of job descriptions</p> <p>Project Management</p> <p>Market Supplements</p>		



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	<p>External resource</p> <p>Scheduling and prioritisation process</p> <p>Developing requirements for additional resource</p> <p>Restructuring of Comms and Support Section</p> <p>Creation of Digital Optimisation and Innovation team</p>
Additional Control	<p>Review of IT, Digital and Data Delivery</p> <p>Continued IT programme management</p> <p>21H2 upgrade</p> <p>Movement from Skype to Teams and mailbox migration</p>
Update	<p>Since the risk was recorded in 2019, there have been several control measures implemented, which has reduced the likelihood score. In addition, the risk was on a project risk register with a 5x5 matrix. It has now been rescored on the Force Risk Matrix (KETO).</p> <p>We have recruited contractors and solutions architects. Once these are capable and trained, the risk can be further reviewed.</p> <p><b>Current status: SORB (Aug 24) to consider reduction in score.</b></p>

<b>STR380</b>	<b>Implementation of the Job Evaluation Scheme</b>		
Responsible Officer	Becky Milligan	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	9
Category	People	Previous Rating	6

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Information	<p>The Equal Pay Audit requires consideration for a different and suitable JES. Following consultation the Force made the decision to implement the Hay Scheme. This has resulted in the development of a new Pay Model which cannot be cost prohibited but was not commissioned for cost saving purposes.</p> <p>With HAY some staff will have a reduction in pay, some will have an uplift and others will see no change. Staff have now been made aware of these outcomes. Other contractual terms such as A-L entitlement connected to rates of pay may also be affected.</p>
Risk rationale	<p>If we do not implement a new JES we will have an out-of-date scheme that does not meet with Equality criteria, and any claims could be substantial. Not implementing it can also carry an issue of having jobs evaluated against an old and a new scheme, creating excessive resource demand. Increasing delays also risk lower morale and reputation.</p>
Existing Controls	<p>Project plan and dedicated management</p> <p>Regular consultation and drop in sessions</p> <p>Gold group provides governance, with Silver group feeding into it</p> <p>AWE design completed</p> <p>Costings included in the medium-term financial plan</p> <p>Data set for pay modelling completed</p> <p>Pay modelling complete</p> <p>Updated data set prepared</p> <p>Employer Offer</p> <p>People Board</p>
Additional Control	<p>Ongoing employee support and communication</p>
Update	<p>Implementation is planned for September 2024. Letters were sent to most staff in May 2024 advising them of the outcome of the evaluations. However some did not receive these and have been subsequently contacted. There are also appeals by staff which are being processed.</p>

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	<b>Current status: SORB (May 24) suggested there was an increase to risk score as scheme is not yet fully implemented.</b>
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STR0292	Violence, Abuse and Intimidation Against Women and Girls		
Responsible Officer	Supt Baker	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	12/09/2021	Current Rating	8
Category	Community Engagement and Partnership	Previous Rating	12
Information	Leicestershire Police is committed to tackling violence against women and girls – and is continuing to engage with partner agencies and the wider public in order to do so. We are also keen to improve women’s perceptions of safety across Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and to ensure that women have the highest level of confidence in our ability and commitment to assist them.		
Risk rationale	In addition to National media attention on the risk to women and girls from violence, Leicestershire Police has seen an increase in the number of reports regarding domestic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could result in an inability to meet Layer 3 strategic performance indicators and impact on our ability to deliver the force pledge.		
Existing Controls	Robust Force Governance structure  NPCC oversight through VAWG Taskforce  Partnership structures- DA and Sexual Violence Requirement – SPB, Adult Vulnerability and Offending Boards – LLR Board to be reinstated.  Force VAWG Action Plan  LLR Safeguarding Adults and Safeguarding Children’s Boards Boards  DHR Review Boards (Leicester City and Leicestershire and Rutland)		

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Dedicated Decision Makers (ensuring stalking, harassment and CCB are recorded alongside other DA offences)

Officer and staff training – rolling for NPOs and additional specialist training given to DAIU, CAIU, Exploitation Team and Signal officers.

Gender Steering Group and action plan

National strategy and work with key stakeholders and partners

Safety of Women At Night (SWAN) funding

Safer Streets

Street pastors

Ask for Angela scheme

Partnership bus

Welfare and Vulnerability Engagement (WAVE)

Targeted social media e.g. You're Right / That's Wrong and NTE-specific messaging

New service to make it easier to report sexual offences online

Problem profile created by the analyst team

Outcome 15 and 16 audit is being managed through CDI

VAWG lead now a member of the Adult Vulnerability and Offending Board

The VAWG lead and operational officers linked into a multi-agency partnership project led by University of Leicester and funded by the Economic and Social research Council, EMPOWER, to develop best practice

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	<p>Lived experience group for sexual violence has been established – VOICES – advising the Response to Sexual Violence (R2SV) Board.</p> <p>The Domestic Abuse Response Team is now embedded.</p> <p>Courageous Conversations events to promote a culture in which VAWG internally will not be tolerated – rolling programme with EDI Team</p> <p>Force review and creation of “layers” – VAWG investigations in Layers 2 and 3. Creation of Layer 3 Crime Board and alignment to the Vulnerability Board chaired by ACC Kerr.</p> <p>Enhanced focus upon performance through governance boards and reporting to SPDB.</p> <p>DA Standard Risk performance monitored in STEPS with a DA Performance Pack for LPD</p> <p>Deep drive Rape Audit developed – early 2024 will be carried out by the Aduti Team.</p> <p>Op Soteria self-assessment and .progress monitoring of implementation of the RASSO National Operating Model</p> <p>National VAWG Action Plan – new 4P plans drafted for 2024-2027</p> <p>Refreshed VAWG, RASSO and DA and Stalking Delivery Plans for 2024 (using 4P approach)</p> <p>Daily DMM focus on unattended DA incidents</p> <p>Lived experience group for sexual violence has been established – VOICES</p> <p>Project Vigilant</p> <p>Threat assessment unit and Power BI</p> <p>Layer 3 governance strengthening</p> <p>RASSO</p>
Additional Control	<p>Outcome 16 scrutiny now applied through new Niche template – newly established, PowerBI tool developed to ensure compliance</p>

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	<p>Monitoring the ability to collect all protected characteristic data on Power BI. Work and engagement with Minerva underway within the NICHE team.</p> <p>Oversight of VAWG related HMIC action plan remains with the Inspectorate Team with appropriate updates provided.</p> <p>Seeking to introduce training provider on Active Bystanders –funding (just under £20k) identified in PSD underspend. Currently awaiting agreement by the People Board to roll out.</p> <p>Development of guidance on the use of language and cultural impact in respect of VAWG is nearing completion. In discussion also with IOPC on their similar work (first draft circulated to partners).</p> <p>VAWG partnerships and commissioning being mapped by the OPCC</p> <p>Violence Reduction Network has secured Home Office Safer Streets funding for preventative interventions with young people to promote healthy relationships, tackle misogyny and develop active bystander programmes for young people in communities across LLR most affected by VAWG.</p> <p>New Rape Team in place.</p>
Update	<p>Project Vigilant Introduced – NTE patrols to identify potential perpetrators of sexual exploitation. Now incorporated into OP Nightsafe – NTE weekly operation</p> <p>Threat Assessment Unit and PowerBi Tool Introduced in 2022. Tool now to be used by NPOs and CMD to inform appropriate response FIB also to utilise and TAU to feed in via FIB to TT&amp;CG</p> <p>Strengthened governance via Layer 3 Vulnerability Board VAWG Coordination board chaired by DSupt Serious Crime-Adults and this feeds in to ACC Kerr’s Vulnerability board. As part of this the Vulnerability Strategy and associated Silver Delivery Plans have been updated taking National VAWG Delivery Plan into account Control strat – strengthen governance – Vulnerability Board</p> <p>Principles of RASSO National Operating Model and Op Soteria principles being embedded Local Op Soteria Project in place with Pillar Leads.</p>

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	<p>Positive Outcome Rates are improving, including Rape and DA. DA arrest rates improving. Still work to do. New Signal Response model in place with SRIs responding to incidents. Current controls in place reduce "Likelihood" from 3 to a 4 and overall risk to an 8.</p> <p><b>Current status: SORB (Aug 24) to consider reduction in risk from 12 to 8</b></p>
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STR0470	Failure of IT Server Affecting Cyclops Database		
Responsible Officer	Jas Minhas	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	02/02/2024	Current Rating	8
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>Leicestershire Police currently operate a Server room at our FHQ that enables us to provide a number of critical systems across policing. Due to its importance and the complicated technical environment inherent in operating a server room, there are a number of protocols that are followed to ensure delivery remains stable.</p> <p>Two of these protocols involve maintaining a stable temperature of the physical environment (between 18c to 20c) and ensuring that we have robust disaster recovery processes in place to protect the data.</p> <p>On the 23rd December 2023 the IT Department were alerted to a heating issue in the Server Room that saw the temperature rise to 40c and this significantly impacted the operation of critical systems. This fault could not be remedied directly as the back-up air conditioning also failed, and the on-call IT took the steps they could, to protect the servers.</p> <p>However, on the 25th December 2023 the same situation repeated itself and a number of systems had to be temporarily powered down to stabilise both performance and protect the integrity of the server infrastructure.</p> <p>As soon as our IT Technical experts were in a position to restore the systems they began doing so and it is at this point that a critical failure of the Server that operates the Cyclops System was identified. Despite the best efforts of our IT Department and our Digital Forensics Unit it has not been possible to restore the Cyclops system as it would have been at the time of the failure.</p>		

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	<p>At this moment in time, the only possibility is to restore the Cyclops Database from a back-up which dates back to the 1st November 2023. In practical terms this means that the data that was entered between the 1st November and the 23rd December will not be available upon restoring the database.</p> <p>Since the event has occurred, a technical working group has been stood up to explore the various options to us to enable recovery of the system and the missing data.</p>
Risk rationale	<p>This poses a strategic risk to the Force for the following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our Force Back-Ups did not work as intended and this meant that we are relying on a relatively old back-up to restore the system.</li> <li>• The Cyclops System stores data linked to HR Personnel Files and OH files for Leicestershire, Notts and Derby Police. The impact of the system being unavailable and having to identify documents that would have been added during this timeframe is significant, as well as having a reputational impact.</li> <li>• The risk of legal claims in future that rely on a document considered lost and irretrievable is a potential issue, albeit remote.</li> <li>• We need to evaluate and learn the lessons and ensure that our infrastructure remains robust moving forward.</li> </ul>
Risk consequence	<p>The Force has had to spend £13k to secure a copy of the corrupted data. The chance of restoring the lost data is considered low and the system has been returned to a live database from the outdated back-up.</p> <p>This means that moving forward we cannot say with certainty that everything that should be on an OH file, HR file etc is complete. We are reliant on targeted actions based on queries to repopulate the missing data. E.g. someone queries a missing OH report and we use IT solutions to locate it.</p>
Existing Controls	<p>Working group set up and OH, HR and regional forces are all assessing the impact of the event on their working practices.</p> <p>Contract with a disaster recovery supplier for replacement equipment is in place.</p> <p>Communications to the Force users has been published and they have been kept updated on attempts to restore the system.</p>
Additional Control	<p>Ongoing working group</p>



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Update	<p>Cyclops is running on new server hardware that replaced old hardware that was exhibiting numerous hard drive issues.</p> <p>Stage one forensic data recovery, to preserve evidence has been completed.</p> <p>COT have tasked ACO Kelly to submit a business case for their consideration/approval if he wishes to proceed with stage 2 &amp; 3 recovery which would attempt to recover lost data without any guarantee of success at a (unbudgeted) cost of around £25K.</p> <p>We've introduced a regular six monthly full review of our daily checks for all systems including ensuring that backups are working correctly and we undertake periodic disaster recovery tests to check our ability to recover systems using backups etc.</p> <p>We have emphasised to our teams the importance of daily checks, including backups, and also monitor daily checks failure calls to ensure prompt action is being taken to address any issues and risks are being escalated to IT SMT.</p> <p><b>Current status: SORB (May 24) reduced risk to medium, as there is a clear plan in place.</b></p>
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STR449	CMD and CB Demand and performance challenges		
Responsible Officer	T/Supt Bunn	Impact: 2	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	12/07/23	Current Rating	6
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	4
Information	<p>CMD has seen a significant demand rise in relation to 999 call volumes. This has increased by approx. 70K over the past 2 full reporting years 21/22 &amp; 22/23. This year 23/24 has seen continued rises on the 9's with May 23 seeing a record 20k 999 calls in one month and June looking likely to surpass this number. A highlight paper was prepared for the Executive group and presented on 20/6/23. As a result the demand rise into CMD has been declared a critical incident. A large proportionate of the rise is believed to be linked to an Android operating system update issue. The increase in 999 calls is a national issue and not unique to Leicestershire.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>Demand rise into CMD is unsustainable on current staffing levels this has resulted in increased wait times for 999 and 101 calls to be answered. It has also had an impact on 999 calls failing over to Northants as a buddy Force. This leads to increased risk to callers on 999 and confidence and satisfaction reduction on all call types.</p>		

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Risk consequence	Failing to manage the risk could result in not meeting the Layer 1 Strategic Performance Indicators which would then prevent the ability to meet the strategic priorities and force pledge.
Existing Controls	<p>Gold group established in March.</p> <p>Chief officer scrutiny over vacancies.</p> <p>Double staffing intake in CMD January 2023</p> <p>Audit team carrying out a forensic review of demand.</p> <p>Gold group action generation and monitoring.</p> <p>59 new starters since June 23</p> <p>Changes to routing of 101 calls.</p> <p>Suspension of call back offer.</p> <p>PCs seconded to CMD</p> <p>Internal and external click before you call campaign</p> <p><a href="#">New designed calling card</a> along with inputs to relevant staff re use launched</p> <p>20 LSTOs trained to handle emails and switchboard calls</p> <p>New sickness line process created removing approx. 5,500 contacts a year with a vast majority of those occurring between 0600-0800hrs</p> <p>2024/2025 recruitment and planning schedule agreed</p>
Additional Control	<p>Plans to train remaining 9 LSTOs</p> <p>Review of 101 answering time commissioned</p>
Update	CMD have reached the new temporary staffing numbers and slightly surpassed these in line with rolling recruitment processes. A cohort of 33 joined in Jan 24 and 15 in March 24. CMD are not likely to recruit additional contact

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	<p>handlers under Q3/4 of this year now. Performance has been strong with April 24 seeing Leics police go top in the national 999 tables for both % answered in 10 seconds and average time to answer. Non-emergency call performance in April was above our own targets at 86.7% in 2 mins and 5% abandonment rate. Average wait time being 41 seconds to answer. Work has started regards impact on the temporary uplift removal of staff and mitigation. A report is planned for Layer board/COT in July 24.</p> <p>CB however have had increased demand which has caused the risk to rise.</p> <p><b>Current status: SORB (May 24) increased the risk to medium.</b></p>
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STR0307	Risk to network storage		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	14/01/22	Current Rating	6
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	6
Information	<p>As part of the Force's Digital Futures Program the infrastructure of our network is changing and will eventually migrate to a predominantly cloud based storage solution. Once delivered this will put Leicestershire Police at the forefront of digital policing and innovation. In the interim, Leicestershire Police are still required to support our current network infrastructure which has been placed under significant pressure from a number of national and local issues.</p> <p>These issues culminated in our Network approaching 98% capacity which triggered a chain reaction of performance related issues, although our operational capabilities were maintained throughout.</p> <p>Currently there is excessive retention of data with infrequent deletion of material. Volume of data stored and acquired from mobile devices constantly increasing, and has become a National Issue.</p> <p>Legacy data is stored in various formats, both hardware storage (significant amount of historical data) and on premises digital storage. This is putting a significant burden on, and exposes the Force to, compliance risks. Current concerns regarding the amount, understanding and requirement of data currently held by the Force.</p>		

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	Requirement to triage data stored and remove data that is no longer required, and implement a robust audit regime, with potential to incorporate a level of automation.
Risk rationale	<p>Effective records management is a legal requirement for all public authorities under the terms of the Data Protection Act 2018. Accordingly, we are obliged to have processes and procedures in place that govern our collection, retention and deletion of data that is held within our Force network.</p> <p>Current digital information storage systems are affecting compliance with CPIA and MoPI requirements</p>
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk will potentially prevent achievement of the Layer 5 Strategic Performance Indicator for the volume of data storage which could then impact on the force strategic priorities and pledge.
Existing Controls	<p>RRD Gold group governance</p> <p>Current network capacity</p> <p>Long term digital growth strategy and road map</p> <p>Financial investment</p> <p>Data deletion and reclaim of storage space</p> <p>DFU deletion of legacy Z-Drive data no longer required, and restructuring data for retention to facilitate effective future review</p> <p>Advice received from records manager</p> <p>DPIA</p> <p>Force Data Storage Board</p> <p>Use of Evidence and Property Archive Centre (EPAC)</p> <p>Published 'Management of Physical and Digital Evidence' guidance</p> <p>Published 'Retention, Storage and Destruction of Materials and Records relating to Forensic Examinations' document</p> <p>Reducing capacity of personal folders and clearing of personal folders</p>

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Additional Control	<p>IT updating unsupported nodes</p> <p>Transition to 'on-premise' network storage solution</p> <p>Hybrid cloud storage environment</p> <p>Discussing new Digital and Data Team</p> <p>Plans to set a 1000 day maximum automatic retention period to reduce data consumed by Spectre and Veriato Protective Monitoring Software saving 50TB of storage.</p> <p>Digital Forensic Transformation Project</p>
Update	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• News article released requiring staff to reduce the amount of files and documents stored in personal folders.</li><li>• DELL support ceases end of March 25, therefore all data <u>must</u> be transferred to the Cloud prior to this deadline.</li><li>• The increased storage, recent data transfers and deletions have extended the date of which network capacity will be reached – 8 months.</li><li>• Leics IT and EMSOU solution architects are progressing the data transfer from the ECS to Cloud storage. The process has been slower than anticipated so contingency options are currently being researched.</li><li>• The records management team continue to review data sets to identify further data eligible for deletion (the more we delete, the less we have to migrate) - Focus has been the network departmental and personal folders, and digital forensic mobile phone downloads.</li><li>• The digital evidential retention processes and schedules for undetected filed cases are currently under review, once agreed (paper due to go back to Exec July 24) the process for identifying and deleting the additional data will be implemented.</li></ul> <p><b>Current status: SORB (May 24) agreed to reduce as storage facility is now working.</b></p>

Appendix D: New Risks

STR0184	Inability to maintain power that sustains the IT system and CMD		
Responsible Officer	Steve Bunn	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	07/04/2020 (previously archived)	Current Rating	12
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p><b>This risk was previously on the strategic risk register and subsequently archived after maintenance. The previous risk title was: Loss of power or cooling affecting ability of IT and CMD to provide service to the force.</b></p> <p>Risk reactivated as we still have the main issue of ageing plant and we cannot do maintenance and upgrade work on CMD very easily as we don't have a mirrored system that allows minimal disruption to core services. As such, there is always a need to close CMD for several days when routine maintenance is done, which is often postponed due to the disruption it causes. It's been some time since the last shut down and maintenance.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>As plant that is housed within the CMD building becomes older it will require more frequent maintenance which will lead to more regular service interruptions. There are ageing power supplies to the building. The breakers (MCCBs) on the critical services panel for the power to the server rooms are unreliable and outdated. There are generators but these could stall in the event of losing power to the site.</p> <p>There are back up locations for CMD but these do not allow all CMD functions to be undertaken.</p>		
Risk consequence	<p>Failure to manage this risk will potentially result in loss of servers leading to an inability to use IT Systems and CMD. The risk also creates uncertainty on the achievement of Strategic Performance Indicators and therefore the force pledge.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>Ongoing maintenance</p>		
Additional Control	<p>Consider a long-term plan for a new Contact Management Centre, keeping the old building and developing it into a mirrored system.</p> <p>Movement of IT Services to the Cloud.</p>		

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Update	<b>Current status: SORB (Aug 24) to consider new (resurrected) risk</b>
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STR0490	Lack of security testing and confidence of Promaps system		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	28/03/2024	Current Rating	12
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	New
Information	<p>Promaps is a suspect identification (ID) parade system, whereby video ID parades can be set up using a database of images of people.</p> <p>Promaps is used by 30 police forces, using the same database of approx.. 50,000 images. While it is a national system it is independently licenced by individual forces and provided by Promat Envision (Promat). Promat currently has no Data Protection Officer, so is not compliant to Data Protection legislation.</p> <p>Promat requests new suspect images are shared with them every year to enable the data set to stay current with respect to trends such as clothing, hairstyles etc. When suspect images are shared with Promat, names are not shared, but the date of birth and other metadata are shared such as ethnicity identifiers, sex etc. such that ID parades of individuals that are similar in appearance can be set up.</p> <p>Promat's distractor database is not encrypted at rest, so there is a risk that a threat actor could compromise the Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability of data if they were to gain physical access to the server. This includes after the server is no longer used as Promat currently do not have a secure disposal policy.</p> <p>Promat also has immature detection controls and security procedures; does no vulnerability scanning and a lack of risk management and auditing processes.</p> <p>The data is stored offshore (Amsterdam based cloud storage) so is not subject to the same levels of data protection as in the UK is subject to, and data is shared with a number of non-UK police forces.</p>		

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	Forces are required to monitor, maintain and patch the underlying infrastructure components that the Promaps software runs on.
Risk rationale	<p>Combination of a lack of security testing conducted by forces and Promat. Promat having an immature risk management position, and a lack of consideration of security when Police information is offshored.</p> <p>Lack of security testing creates vulnerabilities or misconfigurations of security controls and potential for data protection fines.</p>
Risk consequence	<p>Failure to manage this risk will potentially result in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of a large group of citizen’s sensitive data.</li> <li>• Loss of confidence.</li> <li>• ID parade images being invalid as evidence.</li> <li>• Delays in ability to standup an ID parade.</li> </ul> <p>The risk also created uncertainty on the achievement of Layer 4 and Layer 5 Strategic Performance Indicators and therefore the force pledge.</p>
Existing Controls	<p>Risk included on the Police Digital Service (PDS) National Risk Register.</p> <p>Working Group in place.</p> <p>Distractor database.</p> <p>Promat server protected by locked access, alarm system and CCTV monitoring.</p> <p>Blackblaze cloud storage back-up (Amsterdam).</p> <p>Data encryption before loading on to USB.</p> <p>Police IT infrastructure maintenance and monitoring.</p>
Additional Control	<p>Architecture to be stood up for the Promaps software.</p> <p>Migration of distractor database to Azure.</p>



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	<p>Media handling policy is being written.</p> <p>Promat are currently undertaking work to align to Cyber Essentials Plus.</p> <p>Force to undertake security testing/assurance of the remote connection.</p> <p>Investigate options around offshoring of data.</p>
Update	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether or not the image was captured in custody (i.e. whilst the person is under arrest or a voluntary attendance) – there is functionality around this now.</li> <li>• The possibility of making the PNCID field mandatory – this may not be relevant for someone who has never been arrested before and is a voluntary attendee.</li> <li>• Possibly include the arrest summons number field – this will allow court outcome tracking.</li> <li>• Age of the suspect at the time of image capture – this will affect how MoPI is applied.</li> <li>• Offence category/ MoPI rating.</li> <li>• The possibility of an automated alert for images that require a review.</li> <li>• The possibility of including NRAC forms if these are required for each review to rationalise retention.</li> </ul> <p><b>Current status: SORB (May 24) agreed to this new risk</b></p>

<b>STR0489</b>	<b>Delays in vetting halting major projects</b>		
Responsible Officer	Mandy Bogle-Reilly	Impact: 2	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	18/06/24	Current Rating	8
Category	Estates and assets	Previous Rating	New
Information	<p>We used to only use in-house vetting for all vetting. In 2024 we begun to use Warwickshire vetting services (they are a central service for the whole of England and Wales), to reduce demand on our internal vetting team. This meant that Estates projects were being delayed because internal vetting had competing priorities and could not compete with the demand.</p>		

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	Warks offered a solution with a 28-day response SLA for £150 per person (or £300 for a 10-day turnaround). This worked for a time but recently Warwickshire slipped to an official 47-day turnaround, but some have been over 60 days. As individual completes the form we dont have the ability to track them as they go through Warks.
Risk rationale	This will potentially cause significant delays on a range of projects such as CMD Refurb, solar panels, COT garages, EV charging, Keyham Lane chillers (8 months delays) and has already delayed projects such as EU cooling (by 8 months), Canteen freezers.
Risk consequence	This may impact of Layer 5 performance indicators.
Existing Controls	Warks vetting service SLA Force in-house vetting team Online payments reduce admin burden Use of reference numbers to link to the project
Additional Control	Working group for hybrid solution Consider if any areas don't need vetting
Update	PSD Vetting haven't performed vetting checks for Estates since mid-2023 as these checks were handed off to the Warks Police National Contractor Scheme when this department was subjected to unprecedented levels of unplanned demand, generated by the Historical Data Wash.  A decision will be needed as to whether Estates complete the task or leave Estates vetting with Warks NCVS.  <b>Current status: SORB (Aug 24) to consider new risk</b>

**Appendix E: High Priority Risks (Red)**

STR0339	Risk of a successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	26/07/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Intelligence, Information Management and Security	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>A successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police may result in the serious compromise of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information systems, services and assets of the force, potentially hindering operational effectiveness. Attacks can vary in nature and extent such as, malicious software or may include phishing, advanced persistent threats, social engineering and hacking. Attacks may or may not be targeted on the force and may be perpetrated by foreign national governments, terrorists, organised crime groups, hackers or employees. Depending upon the sophistication and scale of attack, there will be varying impacts that may include denial of service, loss or disclosure of information/data and the loss of ability to share information and potentially threatening operational effectiveness leading to harm and reputational damage. There can also be system or application downtime and potential legal consequences.</p> <p>The force has recently fallen victim to a number of phishing emails. The Force has also been contacted by partner agencies who have had their systems compromised which have held Police data. Blocking email addresses is one of our main defences, however, these emails will originate from email addresses that we regularly use and would have little reason to regard as suspicious. Many of these partner organisations correspond with senior members of staff.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>Impact scored at a 4 because there would be major impact on ability to fulfil strategic objectives, major stakeholder concerns and major disruption to service delivery.</p> <p>Likelihood scored at a 3 because there is 51-75% chance of a cyber-attack. It is more likely to occur than not.</p>		
Risk consequence	<p>Due to the reliance on information systems, failure to manage this risk could result in not being able to meet strategic performance indicators across business layers, preventing force priorities and the pledge to be met.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>Staff guidance, training and awareness</p>		

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Assistance from the NMC with cyber related incidents

POLWARP reporting system

Annual Accreditation processes for PSN, PSNP and Airwave

Mail marshall and firewalls for email correspondence and browsing

Technical internal control procedures such as hardening, patching, control of malicious software and passwords

Annual IT health checks

Recruitment procedures including vetting, authorization, access management and leavers

Management of contractors and volunteers

Physical security of buildings and assets

Liaison Between I.T and Information Security

PSD Protective monitoring including monitoring, auditing and reporting capability

GDPR compliance

Security Incident Management Procedure

Cyber Incident Response Training

Partnered working with Cyber Crime

Engagement with the local LRF

Engagement with National Cyber Working Group

Technical internal controls

Oversight from NMC

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	<p>Cyber Incident Response Training</p> <p>On call rota</p> <p>Migration to Sentinel</p> <p>Links made to Cyber Crime Unit and they provide advice and assess our capabilities that are put in to our continual improvement process</p>
Additional Control	<p>Planning an audit on how department heads manage cyber security within BC Plans</p> <p>Detailed list of all valuable assets</p> <p>Define a strategy for IT infrastructure enhancements</p> <p>Improved procedures around cyber incidents</p> <p>Playbooks in development stage</p> <p>New force policy and procedure – sent through for review</p> <p>Comms plan to all staff</p> <p>The Force is in the process of ensuring that all users are onboarded to O365.</p> <p>Migration to cloud began Nov 2023.</p> <p>Workstream tracked by Tiger Bridge Working Group</p>
Update	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Password policy enforcement has been approved at Exec.</li> <li>• Cyber awareness training delivered June and July 24.</li> <li>• Cyber Resilience Group meets every 2 weeks and the work has been broken down into 3 work streams – prevention, detection and remediation. All supported by detailed project plan.</li> <li>• Password weakness identified as significant risk – new comms going out to increase password strength of all Force users – backed up by technical enforcement.</li> <li>• HLR to exec regularly produced.</li> <li>• New cyber incident response plan being drafted to reflect progress and lessons learnt.</li> </ul>

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- HMIC Cyber inspection announced for 2025/26 inspection calendar.

**Current status: No changes to risk score**

STR0411	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	27/10/2022	Current Rating	12
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	12
Information	The air conditioning system at Euston Street is working at 100% capacity. This system should be n+1 as a minimum meaning it should continue to function fully with the failure of half of the plant. This is how it was designed. So much additional IT equipment has been added, n+1 has been lost. If either half of the plant should fail or is taken down for servicing the temperature in the room rises rapidly. If it is not reinstated quickly this could lead to failure of the IT equipment held in the room. The plant is relatively old at about 8 years. If a major part is required and is not "off the shelf" this could take the system down for days.		
Risk rationale	Overheating could lead to complete failure in IT functionality across the force		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage the risk could prevent achieving the layer 5 Estates Strategic Performance Indicators and may also impact on delivering performance across other layers. This may lead to being unable to deliver on strategic priorities and the force pledge.		
Existing Controls	Regular maintenance. A/C engineers on call. Funding approved within 23/24 Capital Programme Briefing paper created with Contingency Planning detailing the planned work		
Additional Control	Proposed move to Cloud system		

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	£670K investment proposed to restore n+1 functionality.
Update	The new cooling system is 80% complete with a predicted completion of September. <b>Current status: Risk score unchanged until work has been completed.</b>

STR0448	Risk to public confidence due to a year-on-year increase of complaints from members of the public		
Responsible Officer	D/Supt Tompkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	10/07/23	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>The level of public complaints continues to rise and as a department, we now predict a likely figure of 1600 complaint this year.</p> <p>Reporting mechanisms have improved means by which the Public can make a complaint which may have some relevance to the increased figures.</p> <p>The trend by complainants at this time appears to be in relation to the quality of investigations and lack of contact.</p> <p>As at December 23:</p> <p>13 officers/staff suspended – for conduct and complaints</p> <p>41 officers/staff on restricted duties – for conduct and complaints</p> <p>Impactive on resource deployment capability, particularly within the Custody Suite.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>There has been no increase in establishment of the PSD Complaints department over the past 4 years, but have secured 1 extra FTE investigator.</p> <p>Using non-PSD restricted staff on short term basis to bolster permanent staff but limited on what they can do.</p>		

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	<p>If continued increase in complaints, potential that will need to start sending out on to area for Sergeants to handle complaints – Force will need to consider this risk and contemplate mitigation by providing an increase in permanent resources.</p> <p>Quality and timeliness of investigations will impact on public confidence if we are unable to manage significant increases in workload.</p> <p>Appeals will increase if quality of investigations is not maintained.</p> <p>Staff health and wellbeing will be impacted.</p>
Risk consequence	<p>Failure to manage this risk could prevent Layer 5 strategic performance indicators to be achieved which could impact on the force priorities and pledge.</p>
Existing Controls	<p>Internal comms regarding the 10 standards of behaviour</p> <p>Training input from PSD to student officers</p> <p>PST checks on officers before they're confirmed in post</p> <p>Vetting in place for officers and staff</p> <p>Extension of crime stoppers line to members of the public</p> <p>Op Forefront designed to reduce complaints</p>
Additional Control	<p>Training across CMD/Custody</p> <p>Revisit of internal comms</p> <p>Engagement with wider force</p> <p>Additional staff needed</p>
Update	<p>Meeting booked in July to re-word risk to include the demand created and possible reduction on quality of investigation by sending work out on area – or create 2 risks.</p> <p><b>Current status: No change in risk</b></p>



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STR0350	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet		
Responsible Officer	C/Insp Parkes	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	22/09/22	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	<p>Leicestershire Police is seeking to transition to a fleet which does not use conventionally fuelled vehicles. This is being planned for sustainability reasons (to reduce our carbon footprint and to reduce our contribution to local air pollution) and to ensure business continuity (given the gradual phasing out of conventionally fuelled vehicles). The benefits to sustainability will be maximised if the electricity supplied is from renewable sources.</p> <p>There have been safety concerns raised in relation to electric vehicles both in their usage, especially when specific operational tactics are used and also during charging.</p> <p>There will need to be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment but there are also potential opportunity costs in bringing extensive electrical inputs onto our sites, especially as the force will need to transition to electric sources of heating rather than gas and these heating systems will reduce the amount of electricity that may need to be brought on site.</p> <p>We are aware that new conventionally fuelled vehicles will probably only be produced up until circa 2028.</p> <p>The cost of fuelling EVs is not necessarily that much cheaper than traditional fuels.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>There are potentially very high impacts to our strategic direction if business continuity challenges are experienced as our service delivery and ability to respond will be undermined. There is also a high impact on the environment if the transition is not made.</p> <p>There are potentially high impacts to health and safety due to the fire risks associated with operational vehicle use plus the learning provided by the fire service regarding response to fires involving thermal runaway.</p>		

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<p>Existing Controls</p>	<p>Liaison with LFRS, Blue Light Commercial, Leicester Climate Change Emergency Partnership, driving school, Emergency Services Environmental and Sustainability Group</p> <p>Oversight of sponsored vehicles</p> <p>Trials of electric cars</p> <p>Vehicle replacement strategy</p> <p>Market research on vehicle charging technology</p> <p>Ongoing opportunities to increase the amount of renewable electricity for force premises</p> <p>Revised Fire Protection Association guidance around charging electric vehicles released</p> <p>Officer awareness of safety issues released</p> <p>Trial of enquiry vehicles and A1 electric van.</p> <p>4 electric cars deployed.</p>
<p>Additional Control</p>	<p>Charging infrastructure to be sited away from buildings</p> <p>Pricing for 10% renewable electricity being explored</p> <p>Vehicle tracking project to monitor vehicle usage</p> <p>Trials of demo vehicles in driving school</p> <p>Planning of future charging infrastructure included in future changes to car parks</p> <p>Service contracts will be included with installation of charging infrastructure</p> <p>Section 106 funding for 5 electric vehicles</p> <p>Bid for specific training courses for driving electric vehicles</p>

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Update	<p>With ARVs, nothing yet meets 24/7 high performance, rapid change so we are writing a business case to project over the next 5 years and beyond to incrementally replace enquiry car fleet, but these are 2-3 times more expensive, plus the infrastructure that goes around it.</p> <p>Bidding to install chargers across 5 sites for the EV trial. This will give us more data in terms of future vehicle requirements and also a better idea of likely costs depending on our rate of changeover. The biggest headache at the moment remains the rapidly dwindling pool of available high-powered vehicles as manufacturers continue their decline in production.</p> <p>There is no significant change at this point in time. The installation of chargers has been delayed due to procurement issues but we are hopeful to begin later this year having now identified a suitable solution.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk score unchanged</b></p>
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STR0383	Lack of PIP 2 Detectives due to lack of staff and training affecting capability		
Responsible Officer	Jim Hatton	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	15/06/2020	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	The lack of PIP2 qualified detectives has been identified as a national issue, and it is having a significant impact within the CAID departments. In 2019 the number of PIP 2 qualified detectives within CAID sat at only 55% of the allocated establishment.		
Risk rationale	CAID should have 423 detectives in place - but currently only has 264		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could prevent the achievement of layer 3 and layer 5 strategic performance indicators, impacting on the force priorities and pledge.		
Existing Controls	Process in place for CID Aides (PC to DC Process). DHEP Program.		

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	<p>PC to DC recruitment process.</p> <p>CID attachments (PIP 1) part of Resource Cell Plan.</p> <p>SERB - seeking to identify and implement force support around placements of officers in the DCs gaps in the period it takes to train DCs. PIP 1 investigators have been deployed into other CAID depts to assist with vacancies - mitigating the skills drain from CID.</p> <p>Review of work allocation in CAIU has been completed.</p>
<p>Additional Control</p>	<p>Adopt a more agile approach to backfilling existing staff on area to allow them to attend courses.</p> <p>Identification of the requirement to futureproof the interest shown, and ongoing requirement to promote detective process. An improved approach to seek direct approach to teams and individuals, with personalised inputs and engagements to enhance and motivate interest in individuals becoming, and remaining Detectives.</p> <p>Force looking to recruit temporary capacity for 2 years to support inexperienced staff. This is being managed by the Resource Board</p>
<p>Update</p>	<p>The projection remains be at 423 full establishment as at January 2026.</p> <p>Currently a pause on pathways moves and assessing Sgt promotions - awaiting stabilisation of Establishment. In the mean time utilising localised action plan to address.</p> <p>New update Proposed TOR for the RRW meeting are:</p> <p>1. Purpose:</p> <p>a. The purpose of the Recruitment, Retention, and Wellbeing Working Group is to develop and implement evidence-based strategies and initiatives to attract, retain, and support Detectives and civilian investigators within Leicestershire Police.</p> <p>b. The working group will focus on identifying and addressing the unique challenges and needs of Detectives and civilian investigators to ensure their recruitment, retention, and overall wellbeing.</p>

2. Objectives:

a. Recruitment:

- i. Develop targeted recruitment campaigns to attract individuals with the desired qualities.
- ii. Implement strategies to ensure diversity and inclusion in the recruitment process.

b. Retention:

- i. Identify and address factors that contribute to Detective turnover within Leicestershire Police.
- ii. Develop and implement professional development opportunities to enhance the skills and knowledge of Detectives and Civilian Investigators
- iii. Establish clear career progression for Detectives and Civilian Cnvestigators, including opportunities for CPD.
- iv. Implement Continue to develop the CAID recognition and reward systems to acknowledge exceptional performance and contributions.

c. Wellbeing:

- i. Develop and implement strategies to support the health and wellbeing of Detectives and Civilian Investigators
- ii. Promote a healthy work-life balance for Detectives and Civilian Investigators through wellness initiatives.
- iii. Establish peer support programs to facilitate connection and support among Detectives and Civilian Investigators.
- iv. Provide access to support services for Detectives and Civilian Investigators

Latest round of DCs exam resulted in increased pass rate - beleived helped by additional resources made available to candidates. Current risk created by requirement for DCs to undertake temporary promotion and also an uplift within the CT network. By September pool of CID aides will be exhausted. Work is ongoing to hear the voice of the staff by means of a forcewide survey to understand barriers to becoming a detective. This alongside the workforce survey will be used to develop a force campaign.

	<b>Current status: No change in risk score</b>
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Appendix F - Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance /Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction	
4	Major disruption to service delivery.  Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: >1,000,000 Business area: >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns.  Major reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: 251,000-1,000,000 Business area: 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage  < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24-hours hospitalisation and /or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force: 51,000-250,000 Business area: 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns.  Significant reputational damage adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital / professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force: <50,000  Business area: <10,000	Complaints from individuals.  Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	

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Likelihood		
	Score	Chance of Occurrence
Very High	4	>75% (almost certain to occur)
High	3	51-75% (more likely to occur than not)
Medium	2	25-50% (fairly likely to occur)
Low	1	<25% (unlikely to occur)

Overall Risk Rating
Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16 = High
5 - 8 = Medium
1 - 4 = Low